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Monday, 28 September 2026

A former shareholder or director of a promoter company can subsequently qualify as an “allottee” under Section 2(d) of RERA where, after exiting the company, the promoter independently allots apartments to that person in his individual capacity under Agreements to Sell. The person's previous association with the promoter does not by itself deprive him of allottee status.

 

Meenu Purohit v. Govind Kripa Infratech Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.

Rajasthan Real Estate Regulatory Authority (Rajasthan RERA)
Case No.: RAJ-RERA-C-N-2025-7847 and 19 connected complaints
Project: GKB's GRACE, Jaipur
Authority: Member Sudhir Kumar Sharma

This is a significant Rajasthan RERA decision on whether a former shareholder/director of a promoter company can subsequently qualify as an “allottee” under Section 2(d) of RERA, particularly where flats are allotted to him as part of an exit/settlement arrangement. The Authority held that he was an allottee, and not merely an investor, and granted substantial relief against cancellation of his 20 flats. 

1. Background and facts

Meenu Purohit, an NRI, had initially acquired a 10% equity stake in Govind Kripa Infratech Pvt. Ltd. under a shareholders' agreement dated 28 September 2015. He was also associated with the company as a shareholder and director.

The project involved was “GKB's GRACE” in Jaipur.

The project remained incomplete, and the parties subsequently agreed that Purohit would exit the business relationship. On 20 February 2019, an MoU was executed under which he agreed to relinquish his shareholding and directorship in favour of Subhash Agarwal and Surekha Agarwal. 

The company was reportedly unable to repay Purohit's investment of approximately ₹3.18 crore, including interest. Instead, the parties agreed that flats would be allotted to him in his individual capacity as a buyer.


2. Allotment of 20 flats

Following the exit arrangement, the company allotted 20 flats to Purohit.

Separate Agreements to Sell were executed between March and May 2019.

This subsequent documentation became crucial to the case.

Purohit's argument was essentially:

His earlier relationship with the company as shareholder/director had ended, and the subsequent Agreements to Sell created a new and independent promoter–allottee relationship.

The promoter, on the other hand, argued that the flats formed part of a commercial exit arrangement connected with his earlier investment and therefore he should be treated as an investor, rather than an allottee under RERA.


3. Subsequent events

The company executed an indemnity-cum-undertaking dated 31 July 2021 concerning the flats.

It subsequently offered possession on 1 July 2023 and issued reminders concerning alleged outstanding payments.

The dispute escalated when the company issued cancellation letters dated 29 August 2024, cancelling all 20 allotments on the ground of alleged non-payment. 

Purohit challenged the cancellation before Rajasthan RERA.


4. Central legal issue

The principal question was:

Whether a former shareholder/director of a promoter company, who subsequently receives flats in his individual capacity under Agreements to Sell after exiting the company, qualifies as an “allottee” under Section 2(d) of RERA?

Rajasthan RERA answered: Yes.

The Authority held that the subsequent transactions established a distinct legal relationship between Purohit and the promoter.


5. Section 2(d) — Who is an “allottee”?

Section 2(d) of RERA defines an “allottee” broadly as a person to whom a plot, apartment or building has been allotted, sold or otherwise transferred by the promoter.

The Authority focused on the legal relationship existing at the time of the disputed transaction, rather than simply relying upon Purohit's historical association with the company.

Thus, the important sequence was:

Former shareholder/director

↓

Exit from company/project

↓

MoU dated 20 February 2019

↓

20 flats allotted in individual capacity

↓

Separate Agreements to Sell

↓

Promoter–allottee relationship

This distinction was central to the decision. 


6. Why the Authority rejected the “investor” argument

Govind Kripa argued that Purohit was essentially an investor because the flats were provided as part of an arrangement to settle his investment.

The Authority rejected this characterisation.

It found that the subsequent Agreements to Sell demonstrated an independent transaction concerning identified flats.

The fact that Purohit received 20 units did not, by itself, transform him into an investor.

The Authority specifically held that:

The purchase of 20 units by itself does not make the complainant an investor; he remained an allottee within Section 2(d). (

Important principle

The number of units purchased is not the decisive test.

The relevant question is:

What is the legal nature of the transaction between the person and the promoter?


7. Purohit's status at the relevant time

The Authority also noted that Purohit was not among the four promoters/directors disclosed when the project was registered in 2017.

This supported his argument that, by the time the disputed flat transactions were executed, he was no longer acting in the capacity of promoter/director.

The Authority therefore treated the 2019 Agreements to Sell as creating a subsequent legal relationship between:

Govind Kripa Infratech → Promoter

and

Meenu Purohit → Allottee. 


8. The payment default issue

The promoter had cancelled the 20 allotments on the allegation that Purohit had failed to make the required payments.

The Authority examined the actual payment position.

For 18 flats, Purohit had paid between approximately 94.77% and 97.76% of the basic sale consideration.

For the remaining two flats, the payments were approximately:

  • 100.24%, and

  • 100.70%

of the basic sale consideration. 

Thus, in relation to most of the flats, the alleged outstanding amount represented only a relatively small portion of the basic consideration.


9. Failure to establish service of payment reminders

The promoter produced payment reminders alleging outstanding dues.

However, the Authority noted that the promoter did not produce proof that those reminders had actually been received by Purohit.

This weakened the promoter's case that the cancellation was justified on the basis of a continuing payment default.

This is an important evidentiary point:

Sending a demand letter

is not necessarily the same as

proving its service/receipt.


10. Cancellation of all 20 flats

The Authority found that the outstanding amounts, generally in the range of 2%–5%, did not justify cancellation of all 20 allotments in the circumstances of the case.

The Authority therefore quashed and set aside the cancellation letters dated 29 August 2024.

This restored Purohit's entitlement under the allotments, subject to payment of legitimate outstanding amounts. 


11. The “win-win” observation

The Authority made a particularly important observation concerning the consequences of the promoter's position.

The promoter's position effectively meant that:

  • Purohit could not cancel the allotments and seek refund; while

  • the promoter could cancel the flats and retain the money already paid.

The Authority considered such an outcome impermissible.

It observed that this would effectively create a “win-win” situation for the promoter, leaving the purchaser with neither possession nor refund.

The Authority held that the promoter could not evade both of its statutory obligations under RERA—namely, providing possession or providing the appropriate refund/relief where legally warranted. 

12. Delay in possession

The case also involved a substantial delay in handing over possession.

The Authority determined that the extended possession due date was 30 June 2022.

The Occupancy Certificate, however, was obtained only on 11 June 2024.

Accordingly, Purohit was held entitled to interest for the period:

1 July 2022 to 11 June 2024

on the amount deposited with the promoter.


13. Rate of interest

Rajasthan RERA awarded interest at:

10.80% per annum

on the amount deposited for the delay period.

The interest was directed to be adjusted against any balance consideration payable by Purohit, with any remaining amount payable to him. 

This is important because the Authority did not merely restore the allotments; it also recognised the consequences of the delayed possession.


14. Additional charges — area and amenities

The Authority also dealt with the promoter's claim for additional amounts arising from changes in:

  • carpet area;

  • built-up area;

  • saleable super built-up area;

  • amenities; and

  • common-area facilities.

The Authority held that Purohit was not liable for additional charges covered by the July 2021 undertaking relating to such changes. 

This provides another layer of contractual protection to the allottee.


15. Final directions

Rajasthan RERA ultimately:

  1. Quashed the cancellation letters dated 29 August 2024 concerning all 20 flats.

  2. Directed the promoter to execute sale deeds in favour of Purohit, subject to payment of legitimate balance charges.

  3. Awarded 10.80% annual interest for the delay period from 1 July 2022 to 11 June 2024.

  4. Directed adjustment of the interest against outstanding consideration, with any balance payable to Purohit.

  5. Held that the promoter could not demand additional amounts arising from changes in area, amenities or common-area facilities covered by the relevant undertaking.

  6. Directed compliance within 45 days of uploading the order on the Authority's website. 

16. Ratio Decidendi

The principal ratio can be stated as:

A former shareholder or director of a promoter company can subsequently qualify as an “allottee” under Section 2(d) of RERA where, after exiting the company, the promoter independently allots apartments to that person in his individual capacity under Agreements to Sell. The person's previous association with the promoter does not by itself deprive him of allottee status.

A second important principle is:

The mere fact that a purchaser receives multiple units as part of a settlement does not automatically make the purchaser an “investor” rather than an allottee. The substance and legal documentation of the subsequent transaction are determinative.


17. Important RERA provisions

Section 2(d) — Allottee

This was the central provision.

The decision expands upon the practical application of the definition where the purchaser has a previous commercial relationship with the promoter.

Section 31 — Filing of complaint

Once Purohit was found to be an allottee, he could invoke the RERA complaint mechanism as an aggrieved person.

Section 18 — Delay in possession

The Authority relied upon the statutory framework concerning the allottee's entitlement arising from delayed possession and awarded 10.80% interest for the relevant delay period.


18. Why this decision is important

This decision is particularly relevant to cases involving:

  • former directors;

  • former shareholders;

  • investors exiting real-estate projects;

  • settlement of investment obligations through allotment of flats;

  • multiple-unit purchasers;

  • developer-investor disputes;

  • cancellation of allotments;

  • delayed possession; and

  • disputes over whether a purchaser is an “investor” or “allottee.”

The key test is not:

“How many flats did the person receive?”

Nor is it simply:

“Was the person previously connected with the promoter?”

The more relevant inquiry is:

“What was the legal relationship between the parties when the flats were subsequently allotted?”


19. Practical legal takeaway

For a person who was formerly associated with a developer but subsequently received flats under individual Agreements to Sell, the documentation establishing the transition is extremely important.

In this case, the Authority placed substantial significance on:

MoU dated 20.02.2019
→ exit from shareholding/directorship

Agreements to Sell, March–May 2019
→ individual allotment of 20 flats

Indemnity-cum-undertaking dated 31.07.2021
→ subsequent acknowledgment concerning the flats

These documents collectively established the allottee–promoter relationship. 


One-line takeaway

Meenu Purohit v. Govind Kripa Infratech Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. establishes that a former shareholder/director who subsequently receives flats in his individual capacity under Agreements to Sell can invoke RERA as an “allottee”; the earlier investment relationship does not automatically convert the subsequent homebuyer relationship into an investor relationship. 

Section 39 of RERA confers a limited power of rectification and cannot be invoked to reopen the merits of an earlier decision, re-appreciate evidence, reconsider disputed questions of fact, or materially alter a substantive finding of liability. Such an exercise would amount to review, which is beyond the scope of Section 39.

 

Kumod Kumar v. M/s Ezzion Constructions Pvt. Ltd.

Bihar Real Estate Regulatory Authority (Bihar RERA)
Case No.: RERA/CC/368/2025
Order dated: 31 August 2026
Project: Ramagya Residency

This decision is important for understanding the limited scope of rectification under Section 39 of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016. Bihar RERA held that Section 39 cannot be used to reopen the merits of an earlier order, reconsider evidence, or remove a substantive finding of liability.

1. Background

The applicant, Kumod Kumar, was a former director of Ezzion Constructions Pvt. Ltd. The dispute arose from an earlier complaint concerning transactions relating to the Ramagya Residency project.

In the original proceedings, Bihar RERA had passed an order dated 11 March 2022, directing Kumod Kumar and another person, Ejaz Hussain, to refund the consideration amount along with interest. 

Kumod Kumar subsequently sought to have his name and liability removed from that order through a rectification application under Section 39.


2. Applicant's case

Kumod Kumar essentially argued that the original order had wrongly attributed liability to him.

His principal contentions included:

  • Clause 6 of the 2012 agreement allegedly placed liability upon directors of Ezzion Trading Company Pvt. Ltd.;

  • he was associated with Ezzion Constructions Pvt. Ltd., which he contended was a different entity;

  • the financial transactions were allegedly handled by Ejaz Hussain;

  • he had resigned as director of Ezzion Constructions with effect from 21 June 2018; and

  • therefore, he should not personally remain liable under the earlier refund order. 

The relief sought was, in substance, a substantive alteration of the earlier order so that his name and liability would be deleted.


3. What is Section 39 of RERA?

Section 39 provides the Regulatory Authority with a limited power to rectify a mistake apparent from the record.

The important words are:

“mistake apparent from the record”

This is materially different from a power to conduct a full review of the earlier decision.

A rectification proceeding is therefore intended for correcting an identifiable error apparent from the existing record—not for giving a party a second opportunity to argue the original case.


4. The central legal question

The principal question before Bihar RERA was:

Can Section 39 be used to reconsider the merits of an earlier RERA order and remove a person's substantive liability?

Answer: No.

Bihar RERA held that doing so would effectively amount to exercising a review jurisdiction, rather than a limited rectification jurisdiction.


5. What Section 39 cannot be used for

The Authority clearly identified several things that cannot ordinarily be done through rectification.

It held that rectification cannot be invoked for:

  • re-hearing the original matter;

  • re-appreciating evidence;

  • reconsidering disputed questions of fact;

  • taking a different view of material that was already considered;

  • substituting a fresh decision for the decision already rendered; or

  • materially changing a substantive finding of liability. 

This is the most important part of the ruling.

In simple terms:

Correction of an apparent error → Section 39

Reconsideration of the merits → Not Section 39

Challenge to substantive findings → Appropriate appellate/other remedy


6. Why the Authority rejected Kumod Kumar's plea

The Authority found that Kumar's arguments required it to reconsider matters that had already been dealt with in the original proceedings.

His request was therefore not simply:

“Please correct an obvious error in the order.”

It was effectively:

“Please reconsider the evidence and facts and reach a different conclusion regarding my liability.”

The Authority held that such a request goes beyond the narrow jurisdiction conferred by Section 39. 


7. Earlier proceedings were also relevant

The Authority took note of the fact that Kumod Kumar had previously filed another rectification petition on 13 February 2026.

That application was withdrawn pursuant to an order dated 11 May 2026.

The Authority was therefore concerned that substantially the same relief was being pursued again by giving the proceedings a different form. 

This is an important procedural point.

A litigant cannot ordinarily keep reopening the same substantive issue simply by changing the label attached to the application.


8. “Rectification” cannot become “review”

This case provides a useful distinction:

Rectification under Section 39Review/reconsideration
Corrects an apparent errorRe-examines the merits
Based on the existing recordMay require reconsideration of evidence
Limited jurisdictionBroader reconsideration
Does not ordinarily change substantive findingsCan potentially alter substantive findings
Corrective in natureAdjudicatory/reconsiderative

The Authority therefore treated Kumod Kumar's application as an attempt to obtain a substantive reconsideration of liability through a provision that does not confer such power.


9. The Authority's observation regarding the procedural reference

The applicant had referred to “Rule 27” instead of “Regulation 27” of the Bihar Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Regulations, 2024.

Bihar RERA clarified that this nomenclature error, by itself, was not sufficient to reject the application.

The Authority examined the application on its substance under Section 39 of RERA.

This is useful because the Authority distinguished between:

a technical nomenclature mistake

and

a substantive jurisdictional defect.


10. What was the final decision?

Bihar RERA rejected the application for rectification.

The Authority held that Kumod Kumar had failed to demonstrate an error apparent from the record that could properly be corrected under Section 39.

The earlier order dated 11 March 2022 therefore remained undisturbed. 

However, the Authority left Kumar at liberty to pursue any other remedy available to him in law, subject to applicable statutory requirements and limitation.


11. Important procedural lesson

The decision highlights a broader principle of RERA procedure:

Choose the correct remedy.

If the grievance is:

“There is an obvious mistake in the existing order.”

→ Rectification may be appropriate.

If the grievance is:

“The Authority misunderstood the evidence and reached the wrong conclusion.”

→ That is ordinarily not a Section 39 rectification issue.

If the grievance is:

“The Authority wrongly imposed liability on me and I want the finding reconsidered.”

→ The party must consider whatever statutory appellate or other remedy is available, rather than attempting to convert Section 39 into a review provision.


12. Ratio Decidendi

The ratio of the decision can be stated as follows:

Section 39 of RERA confers a limited power of rectification and cannot be invoked to reopen the merits of an earlier decision, re-appreciate evidence, reconsider disputed questions of fact, or materially alter a substantive finding of liability. Such an exercise would amount to review, which is beyond the scope of Section 39.


13. Practical significance for RERA litigation

For promoters/directors

Where an individual has been held personally liable in a RERA proceeding, Section 39 cannot ordinarily be used simply to re-argue the factual basis of that liability.

The person must identify an apparent error in the record, rather than merely asserting that the original decision was wrong.

For homebuyers

The judgment prevents a respondent from repeatedly reopening a refund/liability order through successive rectification applications.

This supports finality of adjudication.

For RERA practitioners

Before filing a Section 39 application, it is important to ask:

  1. Is there an actual error apparent on the face of the record?

  2. Can the error be identified without a fresh appreciation of evidence?

  3. Does correcting it require reconsideration of disputed facts?

  4. Is the applicant actually seeking a different substantive outcome?

  5. Has an earlier application concerning the same relief already been filed?

If answering questions 2–4 indicates a merits-based challenge, Section 39 may not be the appropriate route.


14. Key RERA provision

Section 39 — Rectification of orders

This is the decisive provision.

Its purpose is correction, not re-adjudication.

The judgment therefore reinforces the distinction between:

“There is an apparent mistake in the order.”

and

“The order is wrong and should be reconsidered.”

The first may fall within Section 39; the second generally requires a different legal remedy.


Final takeaway

Kumod Kumar v. M/s Ezzion Constructions Pvt. Ltd. is an important Bihar RERA authority on the limits of Section 39 rectification. The Authority refused to delete Kumod Kumar's liability because doing so would have required a fresh examination of the evidence and substantive merits of the earlier refund order. The decision makes clear that rectification is not a disguised review or appeal. 


A promoter cannot materially alter a real-estate project, introduce additional construction or substantially modify common/open/recreational areas contrary to the project plan and disclosures on the basis of which allottees purchased their units, without complying with the consent and other requirements imposed by Section 14 of RERA.

 

Parshvadhara Complex ABCD Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. v. M/s Parshwanath Developers & Ors.

Maharashtra Real Estate Appellate Tribunal (MahaREAT), Mumbai
Appeal Nos.: AT006000000345557 & AT006000000345563 of 2024
Order dated: 7 September 2026

This is a significant MahaREAT ruling on unauthorised alteration of a sanctioned project, additional construction, protection of open/common areas, and the requirement of allottee consent under Section 14 of RERA. The Tribunal ordered demolition of an additional building constructed after a revised sanction, imposed a ₹10 lakh penalty on the promoters, and directed restoration of the project substantially in accordance with the original 2015 plan.

1. Background of the dispute

The dispute concerned the Parshvadhara Complex at Belavali, Ambernath, District Thane, Maharashtra.

The project covered approximately 3,870 sq. metres. The original 2015 sanctioned layout contemplated Wings A, B, C and D and was represented to purchasers through the project's documents and disclosures.

The Tribunal noted that:

  • Wings B, C and D received Occupation Certificates on 29 January 2019.

  • Wing A received its Occupation Certificate on 7 October 2022.

  • Thus, the project contemplated under the original 2015 plan had effectively been completed by October 2022. 

The controversy arose because the promoters subsequently obtained a revised sanction dated 2 July 2021, introducing an additional Building E.

The Society's case was that this additional building was introduced without informing or obtaining the requisite consent of the existing allottees, and that the additional construction adversely affected open and recreational areas shown in the original project plan. 


2. What was the Society's objection?

The Society contended that purchasers had bought their apartments on the basis of the 2015 sanctioned plan, brochure and other project disclosures.

Those documents showed certain areas as:

  • playground;

  • garden;

  • children's playground;

  • recreation ground; and

  • other open/common areas.

The subsequent construction of Building E altered the development originally represented to the purchasers.

The Society therefore argued that the promoter could not unilaterally change the project after purchasers had acquired rights on the basis of the original disclosures.


3. Proceedings before MahaRERA

The Society issued a legal notice on 24 January 2022.

It subsequently approached MahaRERA on 21 April 2022, challenging the additional construction and seeking restoration of the affected areas and amenities.

The dispute ultimately reached MahaREAT through two connected appeals:

  • AT006000000345557 of 2024

  • AT006000000345563 of 2024

The Tribunal heard the Society's appeal as well as the promoters' challenge.


4. Central legal question

The principal question was:

Can a promoter introduce an additional building or materially alter the sanctioned/project plan after purchasers have acquired their apartments on the basis of an earlier disclosed plan, without obtaining the consent required under RERA?

MahaREAT answered this question against the promoters in the circumstances of the case.


5. Section 14 of RERA — the heart of the case

The decision is principally important for Section 14 of the RERA Act.

Section 14 requires the promoter to adhere to the sanctioned plans and specifications and regulates alterations to the sanctioned plan.

In particular, material alterations require the requisite consent of the allottees.

The Tribunal's approach was that the promoter cannot treat a subsequent planning permission or revised sanction from a planning authority as automatically giving it the right to alter the project vis-à-vis purchasers.

Important distinction

There are effectively two separate questions:

Planning authority approval

versus

RERA compliance vis-à-vis allottees

Obtaining revised permission from a municipal/planning authority does not, by itself, eliminate the promoter's obligations towards purchasers under RERA.

That distinction is one of the most useful aspects of this ruling.


6. Why was Building E problematic?

The Tribunal considered the original project documents and the subsequent development.

The original 2015 plan had disclosed a particular configuration of the project.

The later Building E was not merely a minor modification.

According to the Tribunal's findings, its construction affected the open and recreational areas that had been represented to the purchasers.

Therefore, the issue was not simply:

“Did the promoter obtain a revised sanction?”

Instead, it was:

“Could the promoter materially change the project and the rights/amenities represented to the existing allottees without complying with RERA?”

The Tribunal concluded that the answer was no. 


7. The Tribunal's most consequential direction — demolition

MahaREAT directed the promoters to:

Demolish Building E

The demolition was to be carried out:

  • at the promoters' own expense, and

  • within 90 days.

This is an unusually strong remedial direction because the Tribunal did not merely impose a monetary penalty.

It required restoration of the project to the position contemplated by the earlier sanctioned plan.


8. Restoration of open and recreational areas

The Tribunal further directed restoration of the affected areas in accordance with the 2015 sanctioned plan, brochure and other disclosures made to the allottees.

The areas specifically referred to included:

  • playground;

  • garden;

  • children's playground;

  • recreation ground; and

  • other open spaces.

This is important because it recognises that a purchaser's rights under RERA can extend beyond the apartment itself.

The project configuration and promised common amenities can also form part of the purchaser's legitimate contractual/statutory expectations.


9. Conveyance of the project land

Another significant direction was concerning conveyance.

The promoters were directed to execute conveyance of the 3,870-square-metre project land, common areas and open spaces in favour of the Society within 90 days, subject to the promoters' right to dispose of any remaining flats. 

This demonstrates the Tribunal's broader approach: the dispute was not confined to Building E but also concerned the Society's rights over the project and common areas.


10. Additional directions regarding Wing D

The Tribunal also directed the promoters to construct/complete facilities associated with D-Wing, including:

  • meter room;

  • parking; and

  • society office,

in accordance with the 2015 plan. 

This reinforces the principle that the promoter must implement the project substantially in accordance with the commitments and disclosures on the basis of which purchasers acquired their units.


11. Water connections

The Tribunal directed the promoters to pursue the concerned authorities and obtain 30 water connections within 90 days.

This was another indication that the Tribunal was concerned not merely with the legality of Building E but with the completion of the project-related obligations affecting the Society and residents.


12. Completion certificate

The promoters were further directed to obtain the completion certificate in accordance with the 2015 sanctioned plan and provide it to the Society.

This is particularly significant in the context of the Tribunal's direction to restore the project to the original sanctioned configuration.


13. ₹10 lakh penalty

MahaREAT imposed a ₹10 lakh penalty under Section 61 of RERA on the promoters.

Section 61 deals with penalties for contravention of provisions of the Act for which no separate penalty is provided.

The penalty was directed to be paid within 30 days. 

Thus, the Tribunal imposed both:

Corrective relief

Demolition/restoration/conveyance/completion measures

and

Penal consequences

₹10 lakh penalty under Section 61.


14. Outcome of the appeals

The Tribunal:

  • dismissed the promoters' appeal; and

  • partly allowed the Society's appeal.

The MahaREAT therefore modified the Authority's order and issued the additional directions described above. 


15. Ratio Decidendi

The principle emerging from the decision can be stated as:

A promoter cannot materially alter a real-estate project, introduce additional construction or substantially modify common/open/recreational areas contrary to the project plan and disclosures on the basis of which allottees purchased their units, without complying with the consent and other requirements imposed by Section 14 of RERA.

A further important proposition is:

Approval of a revised plan by a planning authority does not, by itself, absolve the promoter from complying with its statutory obligations towards allottees under RERA.


16. Why this case is important for Apartment Owners' Associations

This decision is particularly useful for Co-operative Housing Societies, Apartment Owners' Associations and Resident Welfare Associations.

Where a developer proposes:

  • an additional tower;

  • an additional building;

  • construction on an open area;

  • reduction of recreational space;

  • conversion of a garden/playground;

  • alteration of promised amenities; or

  • substantial modification of the original layout,

the Society can examine whether the proposal is consistent with:

  1. the sanctioned plan;

  2. the Agreement for Sale;

  3. the brochure;

  4. the allotment documents;

  5. the RERA disclosures;

  6. the sanctioned layout;

  7. the common-area representations; and

  8. the consent requirements under Section 14.


17. A crucial legal distinction

The judgment should not be read as saying that every change in a project is prohibited.

The real question is whether the proposed alteration is:

Minor / already contemplated

or

Material / beyond what purchasers agreed to.

For example, a change that is already expressly contemplated by the Agreement for Sale and sanctioned project documents may raise a different issue.

But where the promoter seeks to introduce a material additional development that changes the project and affects areas or amenities represented to existing purchasers, Section 14 becomes particularly important.


18. Comparison with Raintree Boulevard

This case is especially useful when read with the Raintree Boulevard Apartment Owners Association v. L&T Realty Developers Ltd. decision from Karnataka RERA.

The two decisions illustrate an important proposition:

SituationRERA consideration
Change already contemplated/agreed in project documentsFresh consent may not necessarily be required
Material change beyond what was agreed/disclosedSection 14 consent requirements become important
Additional construction affecting promised open/common areasStronger case for requiring allottee protection/consent
Revised municipal sanction obtainedDoes not automatically eliminate RERA obligations

19. Practical takeaway for promoters

Before undertaking additional construction, a promoter should carefully examine:

Original sanctioned plan → RERA registration documents → Agreement for Sale → brochure/project disclosures → common-area commitments → Section 14 → required allottee consent

A subsequent revised sanction from the planning authority should not be treated as a complete answer to the RERA question.


20. Practical takeaway for homebuyers/Societies

For a Society challenging additional construction, the strongest documentary evidence would ordinarily include:

  • original sanctioned layout;

  • revised sanctioned layout;

  • RERA registration documents;

  • sanctioned building plans;

  • brochure;

  • Agreement for Sale;

  • allotment documents;

  • photographs/site plans;

  • records showing the original open/recreational areas;

  • correspondence with the promoter;

  • Society resolutions; and

  • evidence concerning consent or absence of consent.

The comparison between the original and revised plans can be particularly important.


21. Key RERA provisions

Section 14 — Adherence to sanctioned plans

The principal provision in the case concerning alterations to the sanctioned/project plan.

Section 61 — Penalty

Used by MahaREAT to impose the ₹10 lakh penalty for the promoter's contraventions.

Sections concerning common areas/conveyance

The Tribunal's directions concerning conveyance and restoration also demonstrate the broader statutory framework protecting allottees and their rights in relation to the project and common areas.


Final legal takeaway

Parshvadhara Complex ABCD Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. v. M/s Parshwanath Developers & Ors. is a strong MahaREAT authority against unilateral material alteration of an RERA-registered project. The Tribunal found that the promoters could not introduce Building E, affecting areas represented as open and recreational spaces, without complying with the protections available to existing allottees. It therefore ordered demolition of the additional building, restoration of the original open spaces, conveyance-related steps, completion of promised facilities, 30 water connections, and a ₹10 lakh Section 61 penalty. 


Where a promoter makes a valid offer of possession before the stipulated possession date, the allottee is not entitled to delayed-possession charges merely because actual physical possession is handed over subsequently.

 

Mrs. Urmila Kumari Kadam v. M/s Y.B. Builders Pvt. Ltd. & Anr.

Haryana Real Estate Appellate Tribunal (Haryana REAT)
Appeal No. 696 of 2026
Decision: 31 August 2026
Bench: Justice Rajan Gupta, Chairman, and Dinesh Singh Chauhan, Technical Member.

1. Core issue

The principal question before the Tribunal was:

Whether a homebuyer is entitled to delayed-possession charges when the promoter makes a valid offer of possession before the contractual/stipulated possession date, even though actual physical possession is handed over later?

The Haryana REAT answered No, holding that a valid offer of possession made before the due date ends the promoter's liability for delay compensation, provided the offer is legally valid.


2. Facts of the case

Mrs. Urmila Kumari Kadam had booked a unit in the Nimai Palace project developed by Y.B. Builders Pvt. Ltd. and Nimai Developers.

The relevant financial details were:

  • Total sale consideration: ₹67,37,923

  • Amount paid by the allottee: ₹50 lakh

  • Builder Buyer Agreement: No agreement was executed between the parties.

The possession date became an important point of controversy.

The Tribunal accepted 11 June 2023 as the possession due date.

However, the promoters had made an offer of possession on 1 April 2023, i.e. more than two months before the stipulated possession date.

There was also an important regulatory development:

  • Occupation Certificate in principle: 10 February 2023

  • Final Occupation Certificate: 12 April 2023

  • Offer of possession: 1 April 2023.


3. Buyer's claim

Mrs. Kadam approached the Haryana Real Estate Regulatory Authority (HRERA), Gurugram, on 1 July 2025.

Her principal claim was for delayed-possession charges/interest up to the date of actual handing over of possession.

Her case was essentially that the possession due date had been incorrectly calculated and that she remained entitled to compensation for the period before actual possession. 


4. Promoters' defence

The promoters disputed the claim.

They contended, among other things, that:

  • the allottee had not adhered to the payment schedule;

  • repeated communications had been sent requesting payment;

  • she had not come forward to execute the Builder Buyer Agreement; and

  • a valid offer of possession had already been made on 1 April 2023. 

The promoters therefore argued that there was no continuing delay for which delayed-possession compensation could be claimed.


5. Order of the Haryana RERA Authority

The Haryana RERA Authority, by its order dated 12 March 2026, rejected the allottee's claim for delayed-possession charges.

It also directed the allottee to clear the outstanding dues.

If she defaulted, the promoters were permitted to charge interest at the prescribed rate of 10.80%.

The Authority further directed the promoters to:

  • hand over physical possession within 30 days after payment of outstanding dues, if any; and

  • execute the conveyance deed within 90 days after payment of requisite charges. 

Mrs. Kadam challenged this decision before the Haryana REAT.


6. Findings of Haryana REAT

The Tribunal upheld the Authority's decision.

A. Possession due date

The Tribunal agreed with the Authority that the possession due date was 11 June 2023.

B. Offer of possession

The decisive factor was that the promoters had made an offer of possession on 1 April 2023.

This was before 11 June 2023.

The Tribunal held that this constituted a valid offer of possession. 

C. Effect of a valid offer

Once a valid offer of possession was made before the stipulated date, the Tribunal held that the allottee could not claim delayed-possession charges.

The Tribunal specifically observed that because the valid offer was made on 1 April 2023, the allottee was not entitled to delay-possession charges. 


7. The important legal principle

The case establishes an important distinction between:

Date of actual physical possession

and

Date of valid offer of possession.

For the purpose of determining delay liability, the latter can be decisive.

In simplified form:

Stipulated possession date: 11 June 2023
Valid possession offer: 1 April 2023

Since:

1 April 2023 < 11 June 2023

the promoter was not treated as being in delay merely because physical possession was handed over later.


8. Why “valid” offer is important

The most important word in the judgment is “valid.”

The decision should not be read as saying that a promoter can simply issue a possession letter before the due date and automatically escape liability.

The offer must actually constitute a legally valid offer of possession.

This is particularly important because the facts show that the final Occupation Certificate was issued on 12 April 2023, whereas the possession offer was made on 1 April 2023. 

The Tribunal nevertheless accepted the possession offer as valid in the circumstances of this case.

Therefore, in applying this judgment to another matter, one should examine:

  • whether the requisite approvals were available;

  • whether the unit was legally capable of being possessed;

  • whether the offer was unconditional or subject to material conditions;

  • whether statutory requirements had been satisfied;

  • whether the allottee was actually in a position to take possession; and

  • whether any outstanding obligations of the promoter prevented effective possession.


9. Builder Buyer Agreement — an interesting aspect

Another notable aspect is that no Builder Buyer Agreement had been executed.

The Tribunal nevertheless proceeded to determine the possession due date based on the relevant material before it.

The Tribunal also noted that the promoters had already received more than 10% of the sale consideration despite there being no Builder Buyer Agreement. 

This observation is significant because Section 13 of RERA restricts a promoter from accepting more than 10% of the cost of the apartment, plot or building without first entering into a written Agreement for Sale.

However, despite noticing this aspect, the central issue in the appeal remained the entitlement to delayed-possession charges.


10. Was physical possession being handed over later enough to create delay?

No.

This is the central takeaway.

The Tribunal did not equate the date of actual physical handover with the date from which delay compensation necessarily becomes payable.

Instead, it focused on whether there had been a valid offer of possession within the stipulated period.

Thus:

A valid offer of possession before the contractual possession deadline can prevent the accrual of delayed-possession compensation, even if actual physical possession follows later.



11. Practical significance for homebuyers

This judgment makes the possession offer letter an extremely important document in RERA disputes.

A homebuyer seeking delay interest should carefully examine:

  1. the contractual possession date;

  2. the date on which possession was offered;

  3. the date of the Occupation Certificate;

  4. whether the possession offer complied with statutory requirements;

  5. whether the promoter had completed the promised facilities;

  6. whether the possession offer was genuine and capable of being acted upon; and

  7. the reason for the gap between the offer and actual possession.

Simply demonstrating that physical possession came later may not, by itself, establish entitlement to delay compensation.


12. Practical significance for promoters

The decision reinforces the importance of making a proper and legally sustainable possession offer.

A promoter seeking to avoid delay liability should be able to demonstrate that the possession offer:

  • was made within the stipulated period;

  • was supported by the requisite approvals;

  • related to a unit actually capable of being handed over; and

  • complied with the applicable statutory and contractual requirements.

A defective or merely paper-based possession letter may present a different legal question.


13. Ratio Decidendi

The ratio of the decision can be stated as:

Where a promoter makes a valid offer of possession before the stipulated possession date, the allottee is not entitled to delayed-possession charges merely because actual physical possession is handed over subsequently.

The Tribunal therefore found no legal infirmity in the HRERA order and dismissed the appeal and connected applications. (Live Law Biz)


14. Key RERA provisions involved

Section 11

Concerns the promoter's obligations and functions, including adherence to project disclosures and obligations towards allottees.

Section 13

Relevant because the Tribunal noted that more than 10% of the consideration had been received despite the absence of a Builder Buyer Agreement.

Section 18

The principal provision relevant to an allottee's entitlement to interest/refund/compensation in cases of delay or failure by the promoter.

The crucial question was whether the promoter had actually remained in default after making a valid possession offer before the due date.


15. One important caution about the precedent

This judgment should not be cited for the broad proposition that every early possession letter extinguishes delay compensation.

The correct proposition is narrower:

A valid offer of possession made before the stipulated possession date can bar a claim for delayed-possession charges.

The validity of the offer remains a factual and legal question in each case.

This distinction could become particularly important where the promoter's alleged possession offer precedes an essential statutory approval or where the premises were otherwise not legally or practically ready for possession.


Final takeaway

Mrs. Urmila Kumari Kadam v. M/s Y.B. Builders Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. is an important Haryana REAT decision on the distinction between “offer of possession” and “actual possession.” The Tribunal held that where a valid possession offer is made before the stipulated possession date, delay compensation does not become payable merely because physical possession is handed over later. (Live Law Biz)

Source: LiveLawBiz — Valid Possession Offer Before Due Date Bars Homebuyer's Delay Compensation: Haryana REAT

Section 58 RERA appeal before the High Court cannot be used as a general second appeal; the appellant must demonstrate a substantial question of law

 

Balaji Infracare Pvt. Ltd. v. Vikas Sharma

Allahabad High Court
RERA Appeal No. 160 of 2025
Decision: September 2026
Judge: Justice Syed Qamar Hasan Rizvi

The Allahabad High Court examined an important question concerning the scope of an appeal under Section 58 of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (RERA). The Court held that such an appeal can be entertained only where a substantial question of law arises. An order of the RERA Appellate Tribunal remanding a matter to the Regulatory Authority, without finally deciding the parties' rights, ordinarily does not itself create such a question.

1. Background and facts

The respondent, Vikas Sharma, had booked Flat No. 602 in the registered group-housing project Lav Kush Apartment in 2014.

The total sale consideration was approximately ₹1.1597 crore, against which the allottee deposited approximately ₹72.30 lakh.

According to the developer, the allottee subsequently:

  • failed to clear the outstanding dues; and

  • failed to provide the requisite stamp papers for execution of the agreement.

The developer consequently cancelled the allotment on 26 October 2019.

The allottee approached the RERA Authority.

The Regulatory Authority directed the developer to refund the amount deposited by the allottee within 45 days, and the refund was subsequently made.

The allottee, however, was aggrieved by the Authority's refusal to grant interest on the deposited amount and appealed before the RERA Appellate Tribunal. (Live Law Biz)


2. What happened before the Appellate Tribunal?

Before the Tribunal, the issue was essentially whether the allottee could claim interest on the amount deposited despite cancellation of the allotment on account of alleged default.

However, instead of finally determining the entitlement to interest, the Tribunal passed an order dated 14 August 2025.

The Tribunal:

  1. set aside the Regulatory Authority's order;

  2. restored the complaint to its original number; and

  3. directed the Authority to examine the legality and validity of the cancellation under Section 11(5) of RERA. 

This remand order was challenged before the Allahabad High Court by the developer.


3. Developer's arguments before the High Court

The developer argued that the Tribunal had gone beyond the controversy before it.

According to the developer:

  • the original dispute before the Tribunal concerned interest;

  • the Tribunal should not have reopened the entire cancellation issue;

  • the allottee had not challenged the cancellation for almost six years;

  • limitation was attracted;

  • the flat had subsequently been transferred to another purchaser; and

  • the Tribunal had granted relief which, according to the developer, had not been properly sought. 

The developer therefore sought interference by the High Court under Section 58 of RERA.


4. What does Section 58 of RERA provide?

This is the central legal issue.

Section 58 permits an aggrieved person to appeal from an order of the Real Estate Appellate Tribunal to the High Court.

However, the appeal is not equivalent to an unrestricted second appeal on facts.

Section 58 specifically connects the High Court's jurisdiction with the grounds specified in Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Section 100 CPC permits a second appeal only where the case involves a substantial question of law.

Therefore, the statutory scheme is:

RERA Appellate Tribunal → High Court

⬇

Section 58 RERA

⬇

Section 100 CPC principles

⬇

Substantial Question of Law

The Court described the existence of a substantial question of law as the “sine qua non” for exercising jurisdiction under Section 58.


5. What is a “substantial question of law”?

The judgment makes an important distinction between:

Question of fact

A dispute concerning:

  • what happened;

  • whether payment was made;

  • whether a document was executed;

  • whether a party defaulted;

  • what the evidence establishes.

and

Substantial question of law

A significant legal question concerning the interpretation or application of law which satisfies the threshold under Section 100 CPC.

The Court made an important observation:

A disputed question of fact does not become a substantial question of law merely because the parties contest it strongly. 

This is particularly relevant in RERA appeals because parties cannot ordinarily convert factual disagreements into Section 58 appeals merely by describing them as questions of law.


6. Why did the High Court examine the cancellation issue?

Interestingly, although the High Court ultimately dismissed the appeal, it examined whether the Tribunal's remand was legally justified.

The Court found that the question of cancellation was not completely extraneous to the original complaint.

The allottee had questioned the cancellation before the Authority and had alleged that it was:

  • unilateral; and

  • without sufficient cause.

The Court referred to the proviso to Section 11(5).

That provision gives an aggrieved allottee a remedy where cancellation by the promoter is:

  • not in accordance with the agreement for sale;

  • unilateral; or

  • without sufficient cause.

Therefore, according to the High Court, determining whether the cancellation was legally valid was necessary before deciding the consequential question of interest under Section 18.


7. An important fact concerning the developer's subsequent conduct

The Court also noticed an interesting aspect of the developer's conduct.

After issuing the cancellation letter, the developer sent a reply dated 5 December 2019 calling upon the allottee to:

  • deposit the balance consideration of approximately ₹43.67 lakh;

  • pay the applicable charges; and

  • execute the sale deed in his favour.

This correspondence created a live issue concerning the legal effect of the earlier cancellation.

The High Court did not decide whether this conduct amounted to:

  • waiver of cancellation;

  • revocation of cancellation; or

  • something else.

Instead, it left that issue for determination by the Regulatory Authority. 


8. Was the remand order itself appealable?

The High Court ultimately held that there was no substantial question of law warranting interference.

The Court relied upon the general principle that appellate courts do not ordinarily interfere with a remand order, particularly where the remand:

  • does not finally determine the rights of the parties; and

  • does not cause grave injustice or prejudice.

Here, the Tribunal had essentially sent the matter back to the Regulatory Authority for proper examination of the cancellation issue.

The parties remained free to raise their respective arguments before the Authority.


9. Final decision

The Allahabad High Court:

dismissed the RERA appeal.

The Court held that none of the grounds raised by the developer constituted a substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 58 RERA read with Section 100 CPC.

The Court therefore declined to adjudicate the other substantive grounds raised in the appeal.

Importantly, the Court left the parties free to raise their available pleas before the Regulatory Authority. 


10. Ratio Decidendi

The principal ratio can be stated as follows:

An appeal under Section 58 of RERA before the High Court is maintainable only when a substantial question of law arises. A mere disagreement with a remand order, particularly where the Appellate Tribunal has not finally determined the rights of the parties, does not ordinarily give rise to such a question.

The judgment therefore reinforces the limited appellate jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 58.


11. Important RERA provisions

Section 11(5) — Cancellation of allotment

This provision is important because it governs cancellation of allotment by the promoter.

An allottee can challenge cancellation where it is, among other things:

  • contrary to the Agreement for Sale;

  • unilateral; or

  • without sufficient cause.

Section 18 — Return/interest

Section 18 becomes relevant where the promoter fails to perform its obligations, including circumstances involving the allottee's entitlement to refund and interest.

In the present case, the question of interest could not be appropriately considered without first examining the legality of the cancellation.

Section 58 — Appeal to High Court

This was the principal provision before the High Court.

Its significance is that a Tribunal order cannot automatically be challenged before the High Court merely because one party is dissatisfied with it.

The appeal must involve a substantial question of law.


12. Practical implications for RERA litigation

For promoters

A promoter challenging an REAT order under Section 58 should clearly formulate the substantial question of law.

Simply arguing that the Tribunal:

  • reached the wrong factual conclusion;

  • should have appreciated evidence differently; or

  • should have adopted a different factual interpretation

may not be sufficient.

For homebuyers

The decision also demonstrates that a remand is not necessarily adverse to the allottee or promoter.

If the Tribunal sends the matter back so that an important statutory question—such as the validity of cancellation—can be properly decided, the parties ordinarily get an opportunity to establish their respective cases before the Authority.

For RERA practitioners

The judgment reinforces the need to distinguish between:

Question of fact → ordinarily insufficient for Section 58 appeal

Question of law → potentially relevant

Substantial question of law → statutory threshold for Section 58 appeal




Tripura High Court Denies Writ Relief for Suppression of Pending T-RERA Proceedings, Imposes ₹40,000 Costs on Homebuyers

 

Kishore Roy Acharjee & Ors. v. State of Tripura & Ors.

Tripura High Court | W.P.(C) No. 437 of 2026 | Decided: 8 September 2026

This is a significant RERA-related writ decision concerning parallel proceedings before T-RERA and the municipal authorities, suppression of material facts, election of remedies, and the scope of discretionary writ jurisdiction.

1. Facts of the case

The petition was filed by four purchasers of ground-floor units in “The Royal Peace Apartment” at Battala, Agartala.

The petitioners complained about certain constructions allegedly made by the developer beyond the sanctioned building plan, principally:

  • toilets constructed on the northern and southern sides over drains/open areas; and

  • a brick-wall/tin-shed guard room allegedly obstructing access.

The petitioners sought intervention of the High Court for removal/demolition of the allegedly unauthorised constructions and consequential reliefs.

2. Proceedings before T-RERA and Municipal Authority

An important aspect of the case was that the petitioners had already pursued remedies concerning the same dispute before:

  • the Tripura Real Estate Regulatory Authority (T-RERA); and

  • the Agartala Municipal Corporation.

More importantly, an execution proceeding had also been initiated before T-RERA before the writ petition was filed.

The High Court found that this earlier T-RERA execution proceeding had not been disclosed in the writ proceedings.

3. Issue before the High Court

The principal questions were essentially:

  1. Whether the petitioners could invoke the High Court's writ jurisdiction after pursuing proceedings before T-RERA and the municipal authority concerning the same subject matter; and

  2. Whether suppression of the pending/existing T-RERA execution proceeding disentitled the petitioners from obtaining discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution.

4. Finding on suppression of material facts

The Court took serious note of the petitioners' failure to disclose the earlier T-RERA proceedings.

Justice Dr. T. Amarnath Goud observed that the petitioners had not approached the Court with “clear hands.”

This was particularly significant because the undisclosed proceeding was not merely an earlier complaint—it included an execution proceeding before T-RERA, which was directly relevant to the relief sought in the writ petition.

The principle is important: a litigant seeking discretionary relief under Article 226 must make full and candid disclosure of material proceedings concerning the same dispute.

5. Election of remedies / parallel proceedings

The Court also considered the principle of election of remedies.

The petitioners had pursued proceedings before T-RERA as well as the municipal authorities and thereafter approached the High Court.

The Court considered that where a party has already elected and pursued a statutory remedy concerning the same cause of action, it cannot ordinarily seek a second parallel remedy while withholding the earlier proceedings from the constitutional court. (Live Law Biz)

Thus, the case illustrates an important distinction between:

availability of a statutory remedy and permissibility of simultaneously pursuing overlapping remedies without disclosure.

6. Ground-floor common toilet

The Court also considered the practical circumstances surrounding the disputed construction.

It noted that the common toilet was situated on the ground floor and was used by persons such as:

  • security personnel,

  • caretakers,

  • plumbers,

  • electricians, and

  • domestic workers.

The Court regarded such a facility as a basic necessity and found that the authorities were required to consider the ground realities and competing interests of other occupants before directing demolition. (LawLens)

7. Conduct of the petitioners

The respondents also brought to the Court's attention that the petitioners themselves had allegedly been using residential premises for commercial purposes, including a clinical laboratory and an eye clinic, contrary to the sanctioned use/building permissions.

The Court took this circumstance into account while considering whether the petitioners deserved discretionary relief. (PLEAD & PREJUDICE - Beyond the Brief)

Consequently, the Court was not persuaded to exercise its extraordinary writ jurisdiction in favour of the petitioners.

8. Decision

The High Court dismissed W.P.(C) No. 437 of 2026.

The Court declined to grant the requested directions relating to demolition, further proceedings and compensation.

It additionally imposed costs of ₹10,000 on each of the four petitioners, totalling ₹40,000.

The amount was directed to be paid to the High Court Bar Associations within one month, with the petitioners required to obtain receipts. (LawLens)

9. Ratio Decidendi

A party seeking discretionary relief under Article 226 must approach the High Court with complete candour and disclose all material proceedings concerning the same dispute. Where petitioners pursue parallel proceedings before a statutory authority such as RERA and a municipal authority, and subsequently invoke writ jurisdiction without disclosing a material pending execution proceeding, the Court may decline equitable relief on the grounds of suppression of material facts and abuse/parallel pursuit of remedies.

10. RERA relevance

The judgment is particularly relevant to RERA practitioners because Section 31 of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 was referred to in the case. (LawLens)

Section 31 provides the mechanism by which an aggrieved person may file a complaint before the Real Estate Regulatory Authority.

The case therefore demonstrates that although RERA provides a specialised statutory mechanism, parties must also consider the consequences of pursuing overlapping proceedings before RERA, municipal authorities and constitutional courts.

11. Practical impact for homebuyers and promoters

The decision carries two important lessons.

For homebuyers:
Before approaching the High Court, all earlier RERA complaints, execution proceedings, municipal proceedings and orders concerning the same dispute should be fully disclosed.

For promoters:
Where a homebuyer invokes multiple forums concerning substantially the same grievance, the promoter can raise the issue of parallel proceedings, election of remedies and suppression of material facts, particularly where an existing RERA proceeding has not been disclosed.

12. One-line legal takeaway

A litigant who pursues parallel statutory proceedings and suppresses a material RERA proceeding may be denied discretionary writ relief, even where the underlying grievance concerns alleged unauthorised construction.

The judgment was delivered on 8 September 2026 in W.P.(C) No. 437 of 2026, and has been reported as 2026 LLBiz HC (TRI) 7 / 2026 Supreme (Online) (Tri) 390. (Supreme Today AI)

Permitting an unexplained and substantial delay would undermine the legislative objective of providing speedy and effective remedies to allottees.

 

Berry Developers and Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. Ummed Singh & Anr.

Rajasthan Real Estate Appellate Tribunal, Jaipur — Appeal No. 121/2026
Decision dated: 8 September 2026
Complaint No.: RAJ-RERA-C-2023-6625

I have reviewed the full 9-page REAT order. The case is principally about condonation of an inordinate delay in filing a RERA appeal, rather than the merits of the allottee’s claim. The Tribunal rejected the delay application and consequently dismissed the appeal as barred by limitation.

1. Facts

The dispute originated from an allotment made by Berry Developers and Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. to Ummed Singh on 4 May 2016 under the Rajasthan Affordable Housing Policy, 2009.

According to the appellant-developer:

  • the allotment was subsequently cancelled for non-payment;

  • the relevant housing scheme was discontinued before RERA came into force on 1 May 2017;

  • the developer claimed that it was willing to refund the principal amount of ₹3,13,814, but disputed liability for interest;

  • the original RERA complaint was decided by the Rajasthan RERA Authority on 14 August 2024.

The developer thereafter filed Appeal No. 121/2026 challenging the RERA Authority's order.

2. Delay in filing the appeal

The crucial issue was limitation.

The Tribunal recorded that the appeal suffered from an inordinate delay, with the Registry recording 549 days of delay. The appellant sought condonation under Section 44(2) of the RERA Act, 2016.

The developer cited several reasons:

  • attempts at amicable settlement;

  • retrieval of old physical records;

  • complexity concerning jurisdiction, limitation and Section 18;

  • consultation with senior counsel;

  • internal corporate approvals;

  • coordination between the company's Delhi and Bhiwadi offices.

The developer argued that the delay was neither deliberate nor negligent and relied upon Supreme Court precedents favouring a liberal approach to condonation of delay.

3. Respondent's objection

Ummed Singh opposed condonation.

It was argued that:

  • the delay was unexplained and excessive;

  • the alleged settlement discussions were unsupported by documentary evidence;

  • the developer was itself the custodian of its records;

  • internal approvals and administrative processing could not constitute "sufficient cause";

  • the developer had knowledge of the proceedings, including execution proceedings, but had not acted diligently.

The respondent therefore argued that the appeal should be rejected at the threshold without entering into its merits.

4. Issue before REAT

The principal issue was:

Whether the developer had established sufficient cause for condoning the substantial delay in filing the appeal under Section 44(2) of the RERA Act, 2016?

The Tribunal did not proceed to adjudicate the substantive questions concerning jurisdiction, the applicability of RERA to the pre-RERA allotment, or entitlement to interest under Section 18, because the appeal itself was found to be barred by limitation.

5. Finding of the Tribunal

The Tribunal rejected the application for condonation of delay.

It specifically noted that there was no document on record substantiating the alleged settlement discussions. There was no letter showing that the complainant had been invited to participate in settlement discussions, and the complainant's reply did not support the existence of such negotiations.

The Tribunal held, in substance, that merely describing the delay as bona fide or stating that settlement talks were underway is insufficient. The appellant was required to explain the circumstances that actually prevented it from filing the appeal within the prescribed period.

The Tribunal also held that:

  • complexity of legal issues;

  • internal corporate processing;

  • obtaining authorisation;

  • preparation of appeal papers; and

  • the existence of a strong prima-facie case

cannot, by themselves, constitute sufficient cause for condoning such an inordinate delay.

6. Supreme Court principles applied

The Tribunal relied upon several Supreme Court decisions concerning limitation and "sufficient cause", particularly:

  • Basawaraj & Ors. v. Special Land Acquisition Officer

  • Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy

  • Thirunagalingam v. Lingeswaran & Anr.

The Tribunal emphasised that the liberal approach to limitation is not unlimited. The conduct, diligence and bona fides of the party seeking condonation remain relevant.

It particularly relied on the principle that limitation law serves the public interest by encouraging diligence and preventing stale claims from remaining indefinitely unsettled.

7. Importance of Section 44 of RERA

The Tribunal also highlighted the special character of the RERA legislation.

Under Section 44(5), an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal is expected to be dealt with expeditiously, with an endeavour to dispose of it within 60 days of receipt of the appeal.

The Tribunal reasoned that permitting an unexplained and substantial delay would undermine the legislative objective of providing speedy and effective remedies to allottees.

8. Final decision

The Tribunal held that the appellant had failed to establish the required "sufficient cause".

Accordingly:

  1. The application under Section 44(2) seeking condonation of delay was rejected.

  2. Appeal No. 121/2026 was consequently dismissed as barred by limitation.

  3. There was no order as to costs.

  4. The Tribunal directed the Registry to transmit ₹7,28,197.47 deposited by the appellant-promoter under the mandatory requirement of Section 43(5) of RERA to the complainant's bank account after expiry of the appeal limitation period.

  5. Any interim order or pending miscellaneous application stood vacated.

9. Ratio Decidendi

An appellant seeking condonation of substantial delay in a RERA appeal must establish a specific, credible and sufficiently documented "sufficient cause". Mere assertions of settlement negotiations, retrieval of old records, internal corporate approvals, legal consultation or preparation of appeal papers do not automatically constitute sufficient cause. Where an inordinate delay remains unexplained, the Rajasthan REAT may reject the Section 44(2) application and dismiss the appeal without examining the merits.

10. Practical impact

This decision is particularly relevant to developers/promoters seeking to challenge adverse RERA orders after expiry of the statutory appeal period.

The key takeaway is that a promoter cannot ordinarily rely upon internal administrative processes or undocumented settlement discussions to explain a prolonged delay. The applicant should be able to demonstrate, with supporting material, precisely why it was prevented from filing the appeal within time.

The decision also reinforces that limitation is not merely a technical procedural defence in RERA proceedings. The Tribunal connects limitation with RERA's broader legislative objective of providing timely resolution of real-estate disputes.


The statutory time limit under Section 5(2) must be given effect. Administrative delay cannot indefinitely postpone the statutory consequences contemplated by the Act.

 

Delhi Development Authority v. Real Estate Regulatory Authority, NCT of Delhi

Forum: Real Estate Appellate Tribunal for NCT of Delhi

Facts:
DDA applied online for registration of a real-estate project on 28 February 2023. The authority raised deficiencies months later and granted registration only on 3 April 2024. In the meantime, DDA launched its Diwali Special Housing Scheme on 30 November 2023 and claimed deemed registration under Section 5(2). RERA NCT Delhi imposed a penalty of INR 1 million.

Issue:
Whether failure of the RERA authority to grant or reject an application within 30 days results in deemed registration under Section 5(2), even where the application is subsequently said to be deficient.

Held:
The Tribunal held that Section 5 provides a clear 30-day statutory period within which the authority must grant or reject registration. It found no statutory distinction between complete and incomplete applications for triggering the timeline in the circumstances and consequently set aside the penalty.

Ratio:
The statutory time limit under Section 5(2) must be given effect. Administrative delay cannot indefinitely postpone the statutory consequences contemplated by the Act.

Practical Impact:
Promoters and public authorities should maintain proof of filing dates and monitor the statutory 30-day period. RERA authorities must also ensure timely scrutiny and disposal of registration applications.

Relevant RERA Sections:
Section 3 — registration requirement; Section 4 — application for registration; Section 5 — grant/rejection of registration; Section 5(2) — deemed registration; Section 59 — penalty for non-registration.

The doctrine of election does not automatically prevent a party from pursuing two statutory mechanisms where the nature and purpose of the reliefs are different. A RERA remedy and interim arbitral protection can coexist.

 

Rahul Bhargava & Anr. v. Neo Developers Pvt. Ltd.

Forum: Delhi High Court

Facts:
Homebuyers in the Neo Square project had already pursued remedies before HARERA. They subsequently approached the Commercial Court under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act seeking interim protection against alienation or encumbrance of the disputed units. The Commercial Court treated the prior RERA proceedings as preventing the Section 9 proceedings on the basis of election of remedies.

Issue:
Whether a party that has invoked RERA can subsequently seek interim protection under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act.

Held:
The Delhi High Court set aside the Commercial Court's approach. It held that RERA relief and Section 9 interim protection are not necessarily mutually exclusive. The RERA proceedings concern substantive statutory rights, whereas Section 9 can provide interim protective relief in aid of arbitration. The Court granted protection against creation of third-party rights.

Ratio:
The doctrine of election does not automatically prevent a party from pursuing two statutory mechanisms where the nature and purpose of the reliefs are different. A RERA remedy and interim arbitral protection can coexist.

Practical Impact:
Homebuyers should distinguish between the substantive relief sought before RERA and protective/interim measures sought under arbitration law. A prior RERA complaint does not necessarily foreclose Section 9 relief.

Relevant RERA Sections:
Section 31 — complaint; Section 18 — substantive allottee remedies; Section 79 — jurisdictional framework.

Related provision:
Section 9, Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

RERA has its own statutory enforcement and recovery mechanism. A RERA order cannot simply be converted into a CPC decree and executed through an ordinary civil-court execution petition.

 

Mantri Developer Pvt. Ltd. v. Snil Pathiyam Veetil

Forum: Karnataka High Court

Facts:
The respondent obtained orders from KRERA and subsequently attempted to enforce those orders through execution petitions before a civil court under the CPC. The promoter challenged the civil court's jurisdiction.

Issue:
Whether a RERA order constitutes a CPC “decree” capable of execution by a civil court under the ordinary CPC execution mechanism.

Held:
The Karnataka High Court held that RERA proceedings are not civil suits initiated by plaint and RERA orders do not constitute “decrees” under Section 2(2) CPC. Accordingly, civil courts could not entertain ordinary execution petitions for enforcement of those orders.

Ratio:
RERA has its own statutory enforcement and recovery mechanism. A RERA order cannot simply be converted into a CPC decree and executed through an ordinary civil-court execution petition.

Practical Impact:
The correct statutory execution/recovery route must be identified before filing enforcement proceedings. Practitioners should avoid automatically invoking Order XXI CPC merely because the underlying RERA order directs payment or other relief.

Relevant RERA Sections:
Section 40 — recovery of interest, penalty and compensation; Section 31 — complaints; Section 79 — jurisdictional framework.

Section 79 does not transform RERA into a forum for adjudication of every dispute connected with real estate

 

Sana Hospitality Services Pvt. Ltd. v. Madan Kishan Gurow & Ors.

Forum: Bombay High Court

Facts:
A flat was first sold by Mount Mary Builders to Sana Hospitality Services Pvt. Ltd. through a sale deed. The same flat was subsequently covered by another AFS in favour of Madan Kishan Gurow and others, who were put into possession. RERA proceedings resulted in orders concerning possession. The later purchasers instituted a civil suit seeking declarations that their agreement was valid and that they were bona fide purchasers without notice.

Issue:
Whether Section 79 of RERA barred the civil suit involving competing claims of title and bona fide purchase.

Held:
The Bombay High Court upheld the trial court's refusal to reject the plaint. The central dispute concerned title and whether the plaintiffs were bona fide purchasers for value without notice. RERA authorities could not grant the declaratory and injunctive relief sought.

Ratio:
Section 79 does not transform RERA into a forum for adjudication of every dispute connected with real estate. Where the dispute fundamentally concerns title and competing proprietary claims requiring declaratory relief, civil-court jurisdiction remains relevant.

Practical Impact:
Practitioners should distinguish between statutory allottee/promoter disputes and disputes requiring declarations of title or bona fide purchaser status.

Relevant RERA Sections:
Section 79 — bar of jurisdiction; Section 17 — transfer of title; Section 34 — functions of Authority.

Deduction of 10% of the entire sale consideration was excessive

 

Mr. Sudhir Gangadhar & Anr. v. Windsor Edifices Pvt. Ltd. & Anr.

Forum: KREAT

Facts:
The appellants acquired a residential apartment through a tripartite assignment agreement involving the original allottee and promoter. They later sought cancellation for personal reasons and demanded a complete refund. The promoter relied on a contractual clause permitting deduction of 10% as liquidated damages.

Issue:
Whether the purchasers could claim a complete Section 18 refund despite voluntarily withdrawing for personal reasons and whether the promoter could forfeit 10% of the entire sale consideration.

Held:
KREAT found that the withdrawal was attributable to the purchasers' personal reasons rather than promoter default. It rejected the argument that collection above 10% necessarily violated Section 13 because the assignment agreement was effectively treated as equivalent to an AFS in the circumstances. However, deduction of 10% of the entire sale consideration was excessive; deduction was limited to 10% of the amount actually paid to the promoter.

Ratio:
Section 18's no-deduction refund protection is linked to withdrawal attributable to promoter default. Where purchasers voluntarily withdraw, contractual consequences may apply, but forfeiture must still be proportionate and legally sustainable.

Practical Impact:
Buyers seeking refund should clearly establish promoter default. Promoters should ensure that forfeiture clauses are proportionate and do not operate as punitive deductions.

Relevant RERA Sections:
Section 13 — Agreement for Sale; Section 18 — withdrawal/refund; Section 11 — promoter obligations.

A purely virtual or non-lockable space cannot automatically be treated as an apartment merely because it has been sold as commercial real estate.

 

Sushma Choudhary v. WTC Noida Development Company Pvt. Ltd.

Forum: UPREAT

Facts:
The appellant purchased 500 sq. ft. of non-lockable/virtual commercial space in the WTC Noida project and paid approximately 80% of the consideration. She alleged delay and sought refund with interest.

Issue:
Whether non-lockable or virtual commercial space constitutes an “apartment” for purposes of RERA.

Held:
UPREAT held that the purchased space was not a physical, identifiable and demarcated apartment. Consequently, the transaction did not fall within the relevant RERA framework and the complaint was not maintainable.

Ratio:
The statutory concept of an apartment requires a real and identifiable physical unit. A purely virtual or non-lockable space cannot automatically be treated as an apartment merely because it has been sold as commercial real estate.

Practical Impact:
Purchasers of innovative or fractional/virtual commercial products should carefully establish whether the product falls within the statutory definition of real estate/apartment before relying on RERA.

Relevant RERA Sections:
Section 2(e) — apartment; Section 2(k) — carpet area; Section 2(j) — building; Section 31 — complaints.

A claim for brokerage or commission must have a statutory RERA foundation to fall within the Authority's jurisdiction.

 

Pankaj Bhardwaj v. Alpine Infraprojects Pvt. Ltd.

Forum: UPREAT

Facts:
The appellant was a registered real-estate agent who entered into an MOU with the promoter and facilitated bookings. He claimed approximately INR 0.99 million as unpaid commission. UPRERA dismissed the complaint.

Issue:
Whether RERA provides a remedy for a real-estate agent's purely contractual claim for brokerage or commission.

Held:
UPREAT held that the appellant was neither an allottee nor an aggrieved person within the relevant statutory framework for the claim. The dispute was contractual and could be pursued before an appropriate forum.

Ratio:
RERA is not a general contractual-recovery forum. A claim for brokerage or commission must have a statutory RERA foundation to fall within the Authority's jurisdiction.

Practical Impact:
Real-estate agents should distinguish between statutory regulatory grievances and ordinary contractual recovery claims.

Relevant RERA Sections:
Section 2(zm) — real-estate agent; Section 9 — registration of real-estate agents; Section 31 — complaints; Section 71 — adjudication, where applicable.

Not every charge connected with parking is unlawful; its legal character must be examined against the statutory definition.

 

KZK Developers v. Smt. Haripriya Patel & Anr.

Forum: OREAT

Facts:
The allottee paid the full consideration for a flat for which possession was scheduled in July 2020. Possession was delivered only in March 2023. The promoter relied on COVID-19, regulatory issues and non-issuance of OC as explanations for delay and disputed the refund of parking charges.

Issue:
Whether the promoter remained liable for delayed-possession interest despite force-majeure/regulatory circumstances and whether parking charges were refundable.

Held:
OREAT upheld interest liability and held that possession without an OC could not be treated as valid possession. However, it set aside the refund of parking charges because the space qualified as a “garage” under the RERA framework.

Ratio:
The allottee's right to delayed-possession interest is treated as an important statutory protection. At the same time, not every charge connected with parking is unlawful; its legal character must be examined against the statutory definition.

Practical Impact:
Promoters should not treat physical handover without the required OC as complete performance. Buyers challenging parking charges should establish the legal nature of the space.

Relevant RERA Sections:
Section 18 — delayed possession; Section 2(y) — garage; Section 11 — promoter obligations.

After invoking Section 13(4) SARFAESI measures, the bank became subject to the RERA framework

 

 Punjab National Bank v. Asish Kumar Pradhan & Anr.

Forum: OREAT

Facts:
Homebuyers had booked units and paid substantial amounts. The promoter defaulted on a bank loan secured by mortgage of the project land. The bank initiated auction proceedings under SARFAESI, while ORERA had restrained the auction in order to protect the homebuyers.

Issue:
Whether the bank's security rights could override the prior contractual rights of homebuyers and whether RERA could protect allottees against SARFAESI enforcement.

Held:
OREAT upheld protection of the homebuyers. It held that after invoking Section 13(4) SARFAESI measures, the bank became subject to the RERA framework in the circumstances of the case. The prior AFSs created enforceable rights in favour of the homebuyers.

Ratio:
Where purchasers have acquired enforceable rights in specific units before enforcement of security, the secured creditor's rights cannot necessarily be exercised in a manner that defeats those existing allottee rights.

Practical Impact:
Banks financing real-estate projects should undertake due diligence concerning existing allotments and agreements. Homebuyers should establish the chronology of allotment, payment and mortgage.

Relevant RERA Sections:
Section 11 — promoter obligations; Section 18 — allottee remedies; Section 17 — title-related rights; Section 79 — jurisdiction.
The decision also concerns the interaction between RERA and Section 13(4) of SARFAESI.