BOMBAY HIGH COURT Allowed the refund of Stamp Duty, even when the Agreement for Sale was not cancelled within the five years of the execution giving the rational that an act of Court shall prejudice no man and the law does not compel a man to do what he cannot possibly perform.

Satish Buba Shetty v/s Inspector General of Registration and Collector of Stamps and Others

WRIT PETITION NO.9657 OF 2022

Decided on JANUARY 11, 2024

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY 

Fact of the Case:- 

1. On 10/11/2014 the Petitioner Purchased a flat in a building known as “ERA” of the M/s. Vijaykamal Properties Private Limited (the Developer.)
2. The Total Cost of Flat was Rs. 95 lakhs and the Petitioner paid 25% of it to the developer
3. On 19/11/2014 The Agreement to sale was duly registered with the Registrar of Assurances.
4. The stamp duty of Rs. 4,76,000/- was paid to the Exchequer.
5. The Developer had agreed to deliver possession of the flat by 30/06/2017. 

Time line of the Matter :-

1. On the Default of Developer in providing the Possession, the Petitioner filed the case in MahaRERA. 
2. On Date 26/12/2017 MahaRERA directed the the Developer to refund the amount and execute a Deed of Cancellation.
3. On the Non Compliance of the MahaRERA Order the petitioner filed an Execution Application u/s 63 of RERA Act, 2016. 
4. On Date 13/03/2018 MahaRERA imposed the penalty of Rs. 5,000/- per day on the Developer till the compliance of the order.
5. The Developer preferred an appeal before MahaRERA Appellate Tribunal (MREAT).
6. On 21/08/2018 the MREAT stayed the MahaRERA's order but subject to the Submission of 50% of the due amount plus interest, by the developer. 
7. The Developer defaulted on the Order of MREAT.
8. On Date 16/10/2018 MREAT dismissed the Developer's Appeal for want of compliance of order.
9. The petitioner filed for execution before the MREAT.
10. The Developer and the petitioner arrived at a settlement and Developer refunded the full amount by 22/02/2021.
11. On 09/03/2021 the Deed of Cancellation was executed by the petitioner.
12. On 19/03/2021 the Execution Application  was disposed off by the MREAT.
13.  On 31/03/2021 the petitioner applied to Collector of Stamps, Borivali for refund of Rs. 4,76,000/- paid as stamp duty. 
14. On 27/04/2021 the Collector of Stamps, Borivali declined to refund the stamp duty u/s 48(1) of the Stamp Act, 1958 holding that as Agreement for Sale was not cancelled within the five years of the execution.
15. The petitioner preferred an appeal before the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority. 
16. On 09/02/2022, in Appeal No. 111 of 2021 the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority also dismissed the petitioner's appeal u/s 53(1A) Stamp Act, 1958 holding that  the registered instrument was cancelled beyond five years of its execution.  
17. This petition filed this writ under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, on the legality, propriety and correctness of the impugned order.

Submissions by Appellant:-

1. The impossibility of performance of the condition within the period stipulated by the proviso was not properly appreciated by the authorities under the Stamp Act, 1958. 
2. A genuine claim of a bonafide Senior Citizen home buyer, was unjustifiably rejected by the authorities.

Submissions by Respondent:-

1. The petitioner had obtained the entire benefit under the Agreement for Sale.
2. The petitioner had never sought the cancellation of the agreement for sale within the period prescribed under the proviso to section 48(1) of the Stamp Act, 1958.
3. The Stamp Act, 1958 being a fiscal statute is required to be construed strictly.

Observations made by the Hon’ble Court:-

1. The Controversy at hand, is governed by the proviso to sub section (1) of section 48
2. The proviso to sub section (1) of section 48 thus envisages two time limits.
•  One, the registered Agreement for Sale must have been cancelled by another registered instrument within a period of five years of the execution of the Agreement for Sale.
• Two, the application for relief under section 47 be made within a period of six months from the date of registration of the Cancellation Deed.
3. In the case at hand, the authorities under the Act of 1958 have declined to grant the relief on the premise that there was non fulfilment of the first condition of cancellation of the Agreement for Sale within five years of its execution.
4. The submission of the petitioner  that there was, in a sense, an enforced impossibility of fulfillment of said stipulation cannot be said to be unworthy of consideration.
5. there was no indolence or other blameworthy conduct attributable to the petitioner.
6. The question that wrenches to the fore is, in such a situation, can a party who does all that which is in its control, be saddled with the consequence of non-compliance of a statutory prescription ?
7.  In my considered view, the answer has to be in the negative. 
8. The law recognizes impossibility of performance as a ground to relieve a person from forfeiture and penalty.
9. In the case of Shaikh Salim Haji Abdul Khayumsab v/s. Kumar and Others (2006) 1 Supreme Court Cases 46 the Supreme court recognized two maxims,
• “actus curiae neminem gravabit”; an act of Court shall prejudice no man. and 
• “lex non cogit ad impossibilia”; the law does not compel a man to do what he cannot possibly perform.
10. In the facts of the case, the first of aforesaid maxims may have an application in the context of the time which was consumed in prosecuting the remedies before the authorities under RERA. The petitioner could have compelled the Developer to execute the Deed of Cancellation if the transaction was not to materialize, only by invoking the remedies under the law. The time spent in pursuing legitimate remedies, in the absence of any bad faith or want of due diligence, can not be arrayed against the petitioner
11. Secondly, the petitioner could not have lodged a claim for refund of the stamp duty without there being a registered instrument to cancel the registered Agreement to Sale as Cancellation of earlier registered Agreement to Sale by another registered instrument is a prerequisite for the applicability of the proviso to sub section (1) of section 48.
12. Rajeev Nohwar vs. Chief Controlling Revenue, Authority Maharashtra State, Pune and Others 2021 SCC OnLine SC 863. was a case for refund of stamp duty which was purchased but no Agreement to Sale was executed. The Supreme Court found that the provisions of section 47 had no application to the facts of the said case. Yet, the Supreme Court allowed the application for claim for refund observing, inter alia, that a rejection of the application for refund would violate equity, justice and fairness where the applicant is made to suffer the brunt of judicial delay

Court’s Order:-

The petition stands allowed.

The order dated 9th February, 2022 passed by the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority, Maharashtra State, Pune and the order dated 27th April, 2021 passed by the Collector of Stamps, Borivali are quashed and set aside.

The claim for relief under section 47 of the Stamp Act, 1958 stands allowed.

BOMBAY HIGH COURT - The liability of refund falls upon all the listed promoters even if they may not have received the amount in consideration.

BOMBAY HIGH COURT - The liability of refund falls upon all the listed promoters even if they may not have received the amount in consideration.

Wadhwa Group Housing Private Ltd vs Vijay Choksi & SSS Escatics Pvt. Ltd

SECOND APPEAL (Stamp) NO. 21842 OF 2023

Decided on 26 February 2024

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

Time line of the Matter :-

1. Allottee approached MahaRERA U/s 12 and 18 of the RERA act and sought refund of amount of Rs.2,62,35,056/- along with interest as well as compensation and costs.
2. On 24/09/2021 MahaRERA passed the Order holding that Allottee could not claim any equity under the provisions of act and his prayer for refund was rejected, and directed parties to execute registered agreement for sale within 30 day failing which the entire amount was directed to be refunded to the Allottee within six months.
3. Allottee filed Appeal U/s 43 of the RERA Act before the Appellate Tribunal.
4. On 18/10/2022 Appellate Tribunal partly allowed the appeal and set aside the Order directing both the Builders to Jointly refund the amount paid by the Allottee with interest.
5. Aggrieved by the Appellate Tribunal’s Order to put the liability to refund the amount received by SSS Escatics Pvt. Ltd the other Builder Wadhwa Group Housing Private Ltd chose to file this appeal.

Question of Law Framed in Second Appeal

"Whether a promoter who has not received any consideration from an allottee can be made liable for giving refund with interest under Section 18 of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016?"

Fact of the Case:-

1. Builder SSS Escatics Pvt. Ltd, launched a project called “The Nest” as a Slum Rehabilitation Scheme.
2. On 05/09/2012 A JDA (Joint Development Agreement) came to be executed between both the Builders SSS Escatics Pvt. Ltd and Wadhwa Group Housing Private Ltd.
3. Under the said JDA Wadhwa and SSS segregated the constructed area amongst themselves for being sold to customers.
4. On 19/07/2013, Allottee booked a 3BHK Flat bearing B-502 admeasuring 2385 sq.ft in the said project for agreed consideration of Rs.2,65,35,000/-
5. Allottee paid an amount of Rs.1,20,00,000/- towards part consideration.
6.  On 24/07/2013 SSS issued allotment letter to Allottee.
7. The project remained incomplete on the date of coming into force of RERA Act, 2016.
8. The project was accordingly registered as ongoing project under Section 3 of the RERA by SSS in which the Wadhwa was declared as a Promoter (Investor).

Submissions by Appellant

1. Wadhwa cannot be held responsible for refund of any amount to the Allottee as he has not paid any amount to the Wadhwa and that therefore there is no question of refunding any amount to him.
2. As per the JDA both builders identified their respective entitlements in constructed portion of the building and the flat in question falls in the share of SSS, and it  alone received the entire consideration from the Allottee thereby no question of Wadhwa refunding the amount which it did not receive.
3. Mere a change in law requiring reflection of name of wadhwa as Promoter does not create its liability, which did not exist prior to introduction of RERA.  

Submissions by Respondent

1. Wadhwa is undoubtedly covered by definition of the term ‘Promoter’ per se Section 2(zk) of RERA.
2. Definition U/s 2(zk) makes it clear that all promoters are jointly liable under the Act.
3. That a promoter cannot be permitted to defeat the rights of the flat purchasers by making internal arrangements with investors, land owners, etc 

observations made by the Hon’ble Court

1. There appears to be no dispute that the payments were made by the Allottee to the SSS.
2. it is necessary to determine whether Wadhwa falls in the definition of the term ‘promoter’.
3. While registering the project as ongoing project under Section 3 of the RERA, Wadhwa’s name has been included in the list of Promoters. Therefore, Wadhwa cannot run away from the fact that it is the promoter in respect of the project ‘The Nest’
4. Mere falling of flat in the share of the SSS under the JDA would not excuse the Wadhwa from the responsibilities and liabilities under the RERA, Rules and Regulations made thereunder qua that flat. 
5. RERA does not demarcate or restrict liabilities of different promoters in different areas and the liability is joint for all purposes under the Act, Rules and Regulations
6.  Since the Wadhwa is covered by definition of the term ‘Promoter’, it is also jointly liable to refund the amount along with the SSS.
7. Distinction between projects launched before and after coming into force of RERA cannot be a ruse to escape the liabilities as promoter under RERA.
8. The Wadhwa’s contention about absence of privity of contract between it and the Complainant is totally misplaced as it is a matter of indoor management between the Promoters and the flat purchaser who is not supposed to know the intricacies of the arrangements made between several promoters amongst themselves.

Court’s Order

Accordingly the Second Appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs.

In the Second Appeal , BOMBAY HIGH COURT upheld the Condonation of Delay granted by the MAHAREAT Stating that It is not unnatural for a flat purchaser, who had book the flat in 2011 and was yet to receive possession in 2018, to feel anxious especially when he was not permitted to inspect the flat.

In the Second Appeal , BOMBAY HIGH COURT  upheld the Condonation of Delay granted by the MAHAREAT Stating that It is not unnatural for a flat purchaser, who had book the flat in 2011 and was yet to receive possession in 2018, to feel anxious especially when he was not permitted to inspect the flat.

Lucina Land Developers Limited V/s Navin Kumar

SECOND APPEAL NO.585 OF 2020

Decided on 27 MARCH 2024

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

Question of Law framed in 2nd Appeal :-

“Whether the Appellate Tribunal was justified in condoning the delay of 395 days in filing the appeal by the original complainant (Respondent herein)?

Time line of the Matter :-

1. Respondent (Allottee) filed Complaint before the Maharashtra Real Estate Regulatory Authority, (Maharera) complaining non-delivery of possession within the agreed period and claimed interest under provisions of section 18 of the Maharashtra Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (RERA).
2. On 13/12/2017 Maharera disposed of the complaint holding that the Allottee failed to establish that the Appellant did not complete the project or was unable to deliver possession of the Apartment in accordance with the Agreement and directed the Appellant to handover possession of the Apartment with occupancy certificate to Allottee before 31 December 2018, failing which the Appellant was directed to pay interest as per Rule 18 with effect from 1 January 2019 till the actual date of possession on the entire amount paid by the Allottee. 
3. On 11/01/2019 Allottee filed Appeal before the Maharashtra Real Estate Appellate Tribunal (Appellate Tribunal)  challenging the order along with an application seeking condonation delay in filing the appeal. 
4. On 19/08/2019 the Appellate Tribunal  allowed the application for condonation of delay.
5. The Appellant has filed this Second Appeal challenging the judgment and order dated 19th August 2019 passed by the Appellate Tribunal.

Fact of the Case :-

1. Allottee  purchased an apartment bearing No.203 in the project India bulls Greens-II situated at Panvel and Entered into Flat Buyer's Agreement on 18/10/2011.
2. As per the Flat Buyer's Agreement, possession was to be handed over within 60 months with grace period of 9 months.

Contentions of Appellant :-

1.  The Appellate Tribunal has committed a manifest error in condoning inordinate delay of 395 days in filing the Appeal.
2. Allottee  was not prevented by any disability or cause from filing the Appeal within the period of limitation.
3. Allottee took a false plea of heart disease, which was relatable to the year 2016.

Contentions of Respondent :- 

1. No substantial question of law is involved in the present Appeal as the impugned order merely condones delay of 395 days in filing the Appeal.
2. That Condonation of delay is the discretionary power exercised by the Appellate Court in which this Court cannot interfere in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code).
3.  Technicalities cannot be permitted to overtake the substantive rights sought to be agitated by a flat purchaser.
4. That Allottee suffers from serious cardiac ailments for prolonged time, which is evidenced in various certificates produced before the Appellate Tribunal. 
5. That Allottee also faced financial distress on account of health issues suffered by him
6. The Allottee has excellent case on merits, and the same cannot be thrown out on the ground of limitation without considering the merits involved in the Appeal.

Observations of the High Court:-

1. The short issue that requires consideration in the present Appeal is about correctness of the order passed by the Appellate Tribunal in condoning delay of 395 days in filing the Appeal.
2. Condonation of delay is a matter of discretion to be exercised by a Court. So long as exercise of discretion is sound, the Appellate Court shall not substitute its discretion with the discretion exercised by the Court condoning the delay 
3. it cannot be stated that there is complete absence of any cause in the application. Respondent, in his capacity as a flat purchaser first made an attempt to prosecute his complaint personally considering the ease of access provided to parties-in-person before Regulatory Authority.
4. There is sound exercise of discretion by the Appellate Tribunal in condoning the delay. So long as the exercise of discretion by the Appellate Tribunal is not arbitrary, interference by this Court in exercise of discretion is clearly unwarranted.
5.  the Respondent repeatedly pursued various issues with Appellant after passing of the order by the Regulatory Authority. The email correspondence started from 24 February 2018 and went on till 4 December 2018. Most of the emails were in respect of permission to visit the flat, since the Respondent believed that the same was not habitable
6. It is not unnatural for a flat purchaser, who had book the flat in 2011 and was yet to receive possession, to feel anxious especially when he was not permitted to inspect the flat.

Order of the High Court:-

1. the Appellate Tribunal was justified in condoning the delay in filing the Appeal by Respondent.
2. The Second Appeal is accordingly dismissed without any orders as to costs. 

Bombay High Court - Where Part Occupancy Certificate of a Project was granted under the rules of the Authority, a flat owner can not seek cancellation of it on the ground of violation , affecting the other owners , who may not be a party to the case.

before The Bombay High Court

Sanjay Phulwaria And Others

vs

Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority And Others

Writ Petition Lodging No. 2639 Of 2018 With Notice Of Motion Lodging No. 542 Of 2018, Chamber Summons No. 238 Of 2018

decided on 16-10-2018

Where Part Occupancy Certificate of a Project was granted under the rules of the Authority, a flat owner can not seek cancellation of it on the ground of violation , affecting the other owners , who may not be a party to the case.

The sole member of the RERA Authority & RERA APPETITE Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to dispose of order and appeal.

 In the case of man global limited vs ram prakash joukani (Second Appeal No. 14840 Of 2019 Alongwith Civil Application No. 785 Of 2019) the Bombay high court observed that “the sole member of the said Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to dispose of appeal or any application including even an application for condonation of delay in filing appeal.”

Reliance was made on the earlier matter of Neelkamal Realtors Suburban Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. (2017 SCC OnLine Bom9302) where the Bombay high court has held that two member bench of the Tribunal shall always consist of a judicial member. It is also held that in the constitution of the Tribunal, the majority of the members shall always be judicial members.

In the matter of Altus Space Builders Pvt. Ltd vs Union Of India And Others CWP No.32437 of 2019 decided on 16 October, 2020 before Punjab & Haryana High Court the Court struck down Regulations 7 and 8 of the Punjab RERA Procedure Regulations as being ultra vires the Act.

the Court ruled that “A Single Member of the Authority cannot validly pass orders on a complaint under the Act.” 

the Court also ruled that “A Single Member of the Appellate Tribunal cannot validly pass orders in the appeals before it.”

Bombay High Court - A license does not create any title in favour of the licensee

 In the Matter of Suresh Malappa Shetty Vs. Special recovery officer, 2002 SCC Online BOM 1054; (2003) 3 Mah LJ 248

A license is treated to be in permissive possession only and possession is regarded to be with the licensor always. This usually happens in the case of joint development agreement / Collaboration agreement / License agreement and it is noteworthy that a license does not create any title in favour of the licensee

Long term leases would amount to sale and hence lessees will also fall within the definition of "allottee”

 In the Matter of Manju Mahendra Joshi Vs. Lavasa Corporation ltd. Complaint no. AT006000000000096, decided on 17.04.2018 beforeThe Maharashtra Real Estate Appellate Tribunal

In the Matter of Manju Mahendra Joshi Vs. Lavasa Corporation ltd. Complaint no. AT006000000000096, decided on 17.04.2018 beforeThe Maharashtra Real Estate Appellate Tribunal ruled that “ Long term leases would amount to sale and hence lessees will also fall within the definition of allottee”

This Order was further upheld by the Order of Bombay high Court in Lavasa Corporation Limited v. Manju Narendra Joshi (C.A. No. 791 of 2018) decided on 07.08.2018.

On behalf of the lessor it was contended that since the impugned agreement was an 'agreement of lease' and not an ‘agreement for sale’, the provisions of RERA would not be applicable.

The definition of ‘promoter’ under section 2(zk) of RERA was relied upon by the lessor, as it contemplates a person, who constructs or caused to be constructed an apartment ‘for the purpose of selling’.

Reliance was also placed on the definition of 'allottee', under Section 2(d) of RERA, which specifically provides that allottee does not include a person to whom plot, apartment or building is ‘given on rent’.

Reliance was placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of R.K. Palshikar (HUF) v. CIT, M.P., Nagpur and Bhandara, 1988 (172) ITR 311, wherein it was held that lease for a period of 99 (ninety nine) years would amount to transfer of capital assets. A judgment of the Madras High Court was also relied upon, which held that a lease for a period of 99 (ninety nine) years is an alienation as a sale, and mere use of the word 'lease' or the fact that a long term is fixed would not by itself make the document in lease.

The intention of RERA, as highlighted by the Supreme Court in the case of R.S. Raghunath v. State of Karnataka, (1992) 1 SCC 335 was also looked at, which was to protect the interest of consumers who have invested substantial amounts in real estate projects. If they are excluded from the definition of 'Allottee' and thereby from the protection given under the Act, by giving restrictive meaning to the term 'Allottee', the very object of RERA would stand frustrated.