BOMBAY HIGH COURT - The liability of refund falls upon all the listed promoters even if they may not have received the amount in consideration.

BOMBAY HIGH COURT - The liability of refund falls upon all the listed promoters even if they may not have received the amount in consideration.

Wadhwa Group Housing Private Ltd vs Vijay Choksi & SSS Escatics Pvt. Ltd

SECOND APPEAL (Stamp) NO. 21842 OF 2023

Decided on 26 February 2024

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

Time line of the Matter :-

1. Allottee approached MahaRERA U/s 12 and 18 of the RERA act and sought refund of amount of Rs.2,62,35,056/- along with interest as well as compensation and costs.
2. On 24/09/2021 MahaRERA passed the Order holding that Allottee could not claim any equity under the provisions of act and his prayer for refund was rejected, and directed parties to execute registered agreement for sale within 30 day failing which the entire amount was directed to be refunded to the Allottee within six months.
3. Allottee filed Appeal U/s 43 of the RERA Act before the Appellate Tribunal.
4. On 18/10/2022 Appellate Tribunal partly allowed the appeal and set aside the Order directing both the Builders to Jointly refund the amount paid by the Allottee with interest.
5. Aggrieved by the Appellate Tribunal’s Order to put the liability to refund the amount received by SSS Escatics Pvt. Ltd the other Builder Wadhwa Group Housing Private Ltd chose to file this appeal.

Question of Law Framed in Second Appeal

"Whether a promoter who has not received any consideration from an allottee can be made liable for giving refund with interest under Section 18 of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016?"

Fact of the Case:-

1. Builder SSS Escatics Pvt. Ltd, launched a project called “The Nest” as a Slum Rehabilitation Scheme.
2. On 05/09/2012 A JDA (Joint Development Agreement) came to be executed between both the Builders SSS Escatics Pvt. Ltd and Wadhwa Group Housing Private Ltd.
3. Under the said JDA Wadhwa and SSS segregated the constructed area amongst themselves for being sold to customers.
4. On 19/07/2013, Allottee booked a 3BHK Flat bearing B-502 admeasuring 2385 sq.ft in the said project for agreed consideration of Rs.2,65,35,000/-
5. Allottee paid an amount of Rs.1,20,00,000/- towards part consideration.
6.  On 24/07/2013 SSS issued allotment letter to Allottee.
7. The project remained incomplete on the date of coming into force of RERA Act, 2016.
8. The project was accordingly registered as ongoing project under Section 3 of the RERA by SSS in which the Wadhwa was declared as a Promoter (Investor).

Submissions by Appellant

1. Wadhwa cannot be held responsible for refund of any amount to the Allottee as he has not paid any amount to the Wadhwa and that therefore there is no question of refunding any amount to him.
2. As per the JDA both builders identified their respective entitlements in constructed portion of the building and the flat in question falls in the share of SSS, and it  alone received the entire consideration from the Allottee thereby no question of Wadhwa refunding the amount which it did not receive.
3. Mere a change in law requiring reflection of name of wadhwa as Promoter does not create its liability, which did not exist prior to introduction of RERA.  

Submissions by Respondent

1. Wadhwa is undoubtedly covered by definition of the term ‘Promoter’ per se Section 2(zk) of RERA.
2. Definition U/s 2(zk) makes it clear that all promoters are jointly liable under the Act.
3. That a promoter cannot be permitted to defeat the rights of the flat purchasers by making internal arrangements with investors, land owners, etc 

observations made by the Hon’ble Court

1. There appears to be no dispute that the payments were made by the Allottee to the SSS.
2. it is necessary to determine whether Wadhwa falls in the definition of the term ‘promoter’.
3. While registering the project as ongoing project under Section 3 of the RERA, Wadhwa’s name has been included in the list of Promoters. Therefore, Wadhwa cannot run away from the fact that it is the promoter in respect of the project ‘The Nest’
4. Mere falling of flat in the share of the SSS under the JDA would not excuse the Wadhwa from the responsibilities and liabilities under the RERA, Rules and Regulations made thereunder qua that flat. 
5. RERA does not demarcate or restrict liabilities of different promoters in different areas and the liability is joint for all purposes under the Act, Rules and Regulations
6.  Since the Wadhwa is covered by definition of the term ‘Promoter’, it is also jointly liable to refund the amount along with the SSS.
7. Distinction between projects launched before and after coming into force of RERA cannot be a ruse to escape the liabilities as promoter under RERA.
8. The Wadhwa’s contention about absence of privity of contract between it and the Complainant is totally misplaced as it is a matter of indoor management between the Promoters and the flat purchaser who is not supposed to know the intricacies of the arrangements made between several promoters amongst themselves.

Court’s Order

Accordingly the Second Appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs.

In the Second Appeal , BOMBAY HIGH COURT upheld the Condonation of Delay granted by the MAHAREAT Stating that It is not unnatural for a flat purchaser, who had book the flat in 2011 and was yet to receive possession in 2018, to feel anxious especially when he was not permitted to inspect the flat.

In the Second Appeal , BOMBAY HIGH COURT  upheld the Condonation of Delay granted by the MAHAREAT Stating that It is not unnatural for a flat purchaser, who had book the flat in 2011 and was yet to receive possession in 2018, to feel anxious especially when he was not permitted to inspect the flat.

Lucina Land Developers Limited V/s Navin Kumar

SECOND APPEAL NO.585 OF 2020

Decided on 27 MARCH 2024

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

Question of Law framed in 2nd Appeal :-

“Whether the Appellate Tribunal was justified in condoning the delay of 395 days in filing the appeal by the original complainant (Respondent herein)?

Time line of the Matter :-

1. Respondent (Allottee) filed Complaint before the Maharashtra Real Estate Regulatory Authority, (Maharera) complaining non-delivery of possession within the agreed period and claimed interest under provisions of section 18 of the Maharashtra Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (RERA).
2. On 13/12/2017 Maharera disposed of the complaint holding that the Allottee failed to establish that the Appellant did not complete the project or was unable to deliver possession of the Apartment in accordance with the Agreement and directed the Appellant to handover possession of the Apartment with occupancy certificate to Allottee before 31 December 2018, failing which the Appellant was directed to pay interest as per Rule 18 with effect from 1 January 2019 till the actual date of possession on the entire amount paid by the Allottee. 
3. On 11/01/2019 Allottee filed Appeal before the Maharashtra Real Estate Appellate Tribunal (Appellate Tribunal)  challenging the order along with an application seeking condonation delay in filing the appeal. 
4. On 19/08/2019 the Appellate Tribunal  allowed the application for condonation of delay.
5. The Appellant has filed this Second Appeal challenging the judgment and order dated 19th August 2019 passed by the Appellate Tribunal.

Fact of the Case :-

1. Allottee  purchased an apartment bearing No.203 in the project India bulls Greens-II situated at Panvel and Entered into Flat Buyer's Agreement on 18/10/2011.
2. As per the Flat Buyer's Agreement, possession was to be handed over within 60 months with grace period of 9 months.

Contentions of Appellant :-

1.  The Appellate Tribunal has committed a manifest error in condoning inordinate delay of 395 days in filing the Appeal.
2. Allottee  was not prevented by any disability or cause from filing the Appeal within the period of limitation.
3. Allottee took a false plea of heart disease, which was relatable to the year 2016.

Contentions of Respondent :- 

1. No substantial question of law is involved in the present Appeal as the impugned order merely condones delay of 395 days in filing the Appeal.
2. That Condonation of delay is the discretionary power exercised by the Appellate Court in which this Court cannot interfere in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code).
3.  Technicalities cannot be permitted to overtake the substantive rights sought to be agitated by a flat purchaser.
4. That Allottee suffers from serious cardiac ailments for prolonged time, which is evidenced in various certificates produced before the Appellate Tribunal. 
5. That Allottee also faced financial distress on account of health issues suffered by him
6. The Allottee has excellent case on merits, and the same cannot be thrown out on the ground of limitation without considering the merits involved in the Appeal.

Observations of the High Court:-

1. The short issue that requires consideration in the present Appeal is about correctness of the order passed by the Appellate Tribunal in condoning delay of 395 days in filing the Appeal.
2. Condonation of delay is a matter of discretion to be exercised by a Court. So long as exercise of discretion is sound, the Appellate Court shall not substitute its discretion with the discretion exercised by the Court condoning the delay 
3. it cannot be stated that there is complete absence of any cause in the application. Respondent, in his capacity as a flat purchaser first made an attempt to prosecute his complaint personally considering the ease of access provided to parties-in-person before Regulatory Authority.
4. There is sound exercise of discretion by the Appellate Tribunal in condoning the delay. So long as the exercise of discretion by the Appellate Tribunal is not arbitrary, interference by this Court in exercise of discretion is clearly unwarranted.
5.  the Respondent repeatedly pursued various issues with Appellant after passing of the order by the Regulatory Authority. The email correspondence started from 24 February 2018 and went on till 4 December 2018. Most of the emails were in respect of permission to visit the flat, since the Respondent believed that the same was not habitable
6. It is not unnatural for a flat purchaser, who had book the flat in 2011 and was yet to receive possession, to feel anxious especially when he was not permitted to inspect the flat.

Order of the High Court:-

1. the Appellate Tribunal was justified in condoning the delay in filing the Appeal by Respondent.
2. The Second Appeal is accordingly dismissed without any orders as to costs. 

Hon'ble High Courts shall entertain the Writ petitions and exercise their discretionary powers as provided in terms of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, only in exceptional circumstances

Hon'ble High Courts shall entertain the Writ petitions and exercise their discretionary powers as provided in terms of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, only in exceptional circumstances, where either the Adjudicating Authority acted without jurisdiction or there was violation of the principles of Natural Justice.

 In the case of Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks [1998] 8 SCC 1 

wherein, the Supreme Court laid down the triple test for entertaining a writ petition despite availability of the remedy of an appeal in contractual matters i.e., 

firstly if the action of the respondent is illegal and without jurisdiction, 

secondly if the principles of natural justice have been violated and 

thirdly if the petitioner's fundamental rights have been violated.

In the case of Barik Biswas vs Union of India & Ors., Hon'ble High Court of Delhi also dismissed the writ petition and held that 

"the action of coming to this Court is premature and therefore, this Court is of the view that since the petitioners have effective and efficacious remedy under PMLA, necessitating institution of the petition by invoking extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court is not appropriate at this stage. If this Court were to enter into the merits of this case at this stage, it would amount to scuttling the statutorily engrafted mechanism i.e. PMLA."

However, the Hon'ble High Court of Madras in the case of A.Kamarunnisa Ghori and Others , accepted the Writ Petition on a limited point, where the Enforcement Directorate and Adjudicating Authority interpreted the law in a way different from the view point of the Hon'ble Court. Against the argument of presence of alternate remedy, the Hon'ble Court held that "in view of the fact that the order of the Appellate Tribunal is ultimately subject to an appeal to this Court under Section 42 of the Act. By the time the petitioners go before the Appellate Authority and thereafter come up before this Court under Section 42, the petitioners would have long lost possession of their properties" and hence prejudiced.

SC - Right to appeal is neither an absolute right nor an ingredient of natural justice

 Vijay Prakash D. Mehta v. Collector of Customs (1988(4) SCC 402), wherein the  Apex Court observed: 

 "9. Right to appeal is neither an absolute right nor an ingredient of natural justice the principles of which must be followed in all judicial and quasi-judicial adjudications. The right to appeal is a statutory right and it can be circumscribed by the conditions in the grant."

in The Anant Mills Co. Ltd. v. The State of Gujarat (1975(2) SCC 175), it was held that

"...The right of appeal is the creature of a statute. Without a statutory provision creating such a right the person aggrieved is not entitled to file an appeal.

Supreme Court - High Court would be justified in admitting the second appeal only when a substantial question of law is involved

 In the case of Gurudev Kaur and others -vs- Kaki and others [(2007) 1 SCC 546, the Apex Court held that after the 1976 Amendment, the scope of Section 100 has been drastically curtailed and narrowed down, according to the amended section,

(i) The High Court would be justified in admitting the second appeal only when a substantial question of law is involved;

(ii) The substantial question of law to precisely state such question;

(iii) A duty has been cast on the High Court to formulate substantial question of law before hearing the appeal;

(iv) Another part of the Section is that the appeal shall be heard only on that question".

It was also held by the Apex court that 

(i) On the day when the second appeal is listed for hearing on admission if the High

Court is satisfied that no substantial question of law is involved, it shall dismiss the

second appeal without even formulating the substantial question of law;

(ii) In cases where the High Court after hearing the appellate is satisfied that the

substantial question of law is involved, it shall formulate that question and then the

 appeal shall be heard on those substantial questions of

law, after giving notice and opportunity of hearing to the Respondent;

(iii) In no circumstances the High Court can reverse the judgment of the trial court

and the first appellate court without formulating the substantial question of law and

complying with the mandatory requirements of Section 100 Code of Civil Procedure".

in the matter of Nazir Mohamed Vs. J.Kamala and others, 2020 (3) RCR (Civil) 684 wherein after examination of precedents, it has been held:-

"32. To be "substantial", a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled

by the law of the land or any binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on

the decision of the case and/or the rights of the parties before it, if answered either

way."