Search This Blog

Translate the Site.

Showing posts with label NCLAT Orders. Show all posts
Showing posts with label NCLAT Orders. Show all posts

Tuesday, 2 April 2024

NCLAT - Creditors of a class for amended Section 7(1) threshold of 10% or 100 whichever is Lower must be from a particular project registered with RERA

Pankaj Mehta V/s M/s. Ansal Hi-tech Township Limited 

Company Appeal (AT) (INS) No. 248 of 2023 

(Arising out of the `Impugned Order’ dated 06.01.2023 in CP (IB) No. 596 (PB) / 2021)

NATIONAL COMPANY LAW APPELLATE TRIBUNAL PRINCIPAL BENCH, NEW DELHI  


Time line of the Matter :-

  1. The ‘Appellant / Financial Creditor / Applicant’, along with106 other ‘Financial Creditors / Applicants’, had preferred petition ,under Section 7 of the I & B Code, 2016 before NCLT PB New Delhi.
  2.  Wherein, M/s. Ansal Hi-Tech Township Limited, was described as the ‘Corporate Debtor’ and the Total Amount of Debt, was mentioned as Rs.41,81,90,116/- 
  3. On Date 06/01/2023, NCLT,  dismissed the main Company Petition as `Not Maintainable’ terming that the `Allottees’, belong to different Sub Projects.

Fact of the Case:- 

  1. A Project by the name of  'Sushant Megapolis near Dadri Town, adjoining Greater Noida, Uttar Pradesh.  by Corporate Debtor M/s Ansal comprises of Plots / Built-up PlotsRow Houses/ Flats / Floors /  Villas / High-rise Apartments, under various allocated Sites.
  2. License for developing the Township, was granted  in Year2006, by the UP Government with the instruction of Entire Construction be completed by year 2016.
  3. By 2016 the Project was incomplete and M/s Ansal registered 25 separate projects having separate `RERA Registrations’ in this Township with RERA.
  4.  Appellants are 107 different Allottee  who purchased different types of Units such as Plots / Flats/ Apartments /EWS unit , in the Project.
  5. The Possession date of all the allottees  was from 36 months to 42 months, from the date of sanction of the `Layout Plan’ of the `Allotted Unit’. 

Submissions by Appellant

  1.  All the Applicants had entered into respective BBAs, much before the RERA Act,2016 came into force.
  2.  The said `Agreements’, specifically, defines that `Sushant Megapolis’, as one complete `Project’.
  3. The `Single Layout Plan of this project reflects Group Housing/ Plots and EWS Units as part of `One Project’, comprising of 2504 Acres of Property.
  4. A Single  Application for Environmental Clearance, was filed for the entire project. 
  5.  The Project in question, is a `Single Real Estate Project’, for the purposes of Section 7 of the IB Code, 2016.
  6. It therefore, falls under the requisite ambit of the provisos of the amended Section 7(1) of the IB Code 2016 pertaining to the minimum threshold requirement of 100 Allottees or 10% of the Total Allottees, whichever is less, belonging to the `same Real Estate project’. 
  7. The NCLT, Passed the impugned Judgment without considering the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Manish Kumar v. Union of India & Ors  (2021) 5 SCC OnLine SCC 1, wherein, it is observed that a Real estate project can be a composite one for Plots and Apartments or for Plots & Buildings.
  8. Further, the definition of `Allottee’, is split into broadly three Categories Plot, Apartment and Building and the `Purchasers’ of all these are covered under the term `Allottee’ 
  9.  The interpretation, laid down by the was incorrect  that 100 or 10% of the `Allottees’, must be from the `same Building’, and `not from the same `Real Estate Project’.

Submissions by Respondent

  1. The Township, consists of Multiple Residential  and Commercial Real Estate Project, and all the sub-projects, are independent of each other and are being developed and sold as separate Projects.
  2. Each and Every phase, is registered as a stand-alone Real Estate Project under RERA with separate `RERA Registration Numbers’
  3. As per Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, that the task of ascertaining who will be Allottees and therefore, what would constitute 10% of total number of Allottees must depend upon the nature of the `Real Estate Project’.
  4.  The Petitioners do not satisfy the required threshold limit of 10% or 100 persons’, whichever is lower, in none of the Project / Project categories, 
  5. Approximately 50 Petitioners are either Co-Applicants or Third Applicants for a Single Unit just to fulfill the requisite number of 100 Allottees. whereas in the matter of Manish Kumar v. Union of India, wherein, it is held that `one unit equals to one Allottees’, even though, the said Unit is jointly held. 
  6. The NCLT  made ‘inquiry’ and considered all the records pertaining to the Project.

Observations made by the Hon’ble Court.

  1. The Corporate Debtor, had executed, at least Three different kinds of Agreements, namely  (a) `Plot Allottee Agreement’ (b) `Built-up Unit Allottee Agreement’ and (c) `Apartment Allottee Agreement as the projects were of `different character’ with `different type of developments with independent, RERA Registrations. ’
  2. In none of the Projects / Project Categories, the Applicants  fulfil the requirement of Threshold Limit’ of 10% or 100 persons, whichever is less. 
  3. the Appellant are from different numerous projects, and they have not established their case, as `Creditors of a class’, concerning any `particular project’, registered with RERA, with a view to fulfil the requirement of  Section 7 (1) of the IBC in regards to 10% or 100 Allottees’
  4. In the present case on hand, the foremost aspect to be taken into account is the RERA Registration of the Projects, of the Corporate Debtor, for ensuring the Initial limit for pressing into service of the ingredients of Section 7 of the Code. 
  5. The `Impugned Order’ and the views expressed in dismissing the CP (IB) No. 596 (PB) / 2021, is free from any `legal flaws’. 

Court’s Order

Accordingly the instant `Appeal’ sans merits is `Dismissed’ with no costs.


Tuesday, 26 December 2023

NCLAT New Delhi- Association of the home-buyers of Real Estate Project is aggrieved person within the meaning of Section 61 of the Code.

 IN THE NATIONAL COMPANY LAW APPELLATE TRIBUNAL

Principal Bench, New Delhi

Real Estate Regulatory Authority
v.
D.B. Corp Ltd. & Anr.

Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 1172-1173 of 2022 with 1321 of 2022
Decided on 08-Dec-23

Brief about the decision:

Facts of the case

  • Corporate Debtor entered into Barter Agreement with Operational Creditor for extensive advertising campaign of its projects. Pursuant to the Agreement, the Operational Creditor was to publish Advertisement for consideration which included cash component and Barter Component. The Cash Component against the advertising was to the paid and the Barter Component was to be utilized in form of allotment of units which were required to be transferred in favour of the Operational Creditor.
  • The RERA received various complaints from allottees of the Corporate Debtor, which complaints were entertained and various orders related to different projects were passed in the year 2020-21 directing the Corporate Debtor to refund the amount along with compensation to various complainants. RERA also passed an order on 18.08.2021 under Section 35 of the RERA Act, 2016 to investigate about the diversion of funds from the designated account.
  • Orders were also passed on 23.03.2022 by RERA revoking the registration of real estate project ‘Aakriti Business Arcade’ and directing for appointment of an agency for completion of the said project under Section 8 of the RERA Act, 2016.
  • An application under Section 9 was filed by the Operational Creditor before the Adjudicating Authority on 02.02.2022 claiming default of operational debt of Rs.10,77,17,000/- with interest consequent to the Barter Agreement entered between the Operational Creditor and the Corporate Debtor and same has been admitted by Adjudicating Authority (NCLT), Indore Bench, Court No.1.
  • Appellants herein Regulatory Authority(RERA) constituted under Section 20 of the RERA Act, 2016, Interim Resolution Professional and Aquacity Consumer and Societies Welfare Society’ which claim to be association of 74 homebuyers have challenged the CIRP admission order under Sec. 9 of IBC of NCLT.
  • The Appellant, Aquacity Consumer and Societies Welfare Society claiming to be a society of homebuyers claimed to have filed two consumer complaints under Section 12(1)(b) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 for its members/homebuyers. The NCDRC allowed both the Consumer Complaints and directed the Corporate Debtor to refund the amount collected from the homebuyers along with interest of 9% pa from the date of possession. Civil Appeals were filed before the Hon’ble Supreme Court by the Appellant Association for modification of the order of NCDRC to the extent that the interest should be from the date of payment and not from the date of possession. In the Appeals notices were issued.


Decision of the Appellate Tribunal

A. Question No. I: Whether RERA has locus to challenge CIRP admission order before NCLAT?

  • Section 61 of the Code, 2016 provides for an Appeal by “any person aggrieved by the Order of the Adjudicating Authority”. Section 61, sub- Section (1) uses the expression “any person aggrieved”.(p12)
  • RERA is a statutory authority under Section 20 sub-section (2). RERA is a body corporate and is entitled to sue or to be sued in its name. RERA is thus fully competent to sue in its name. Question of locus to file an Appeal as an aggrieved person and the question as to whether appeal filed by the aggrieved person is to succeed, are two different questions and the question of locus is not dependent on success of the grounds in the Appeal.(p18)
  • In the present case the RERA has taken various actions against the Corporate Debtor and various orders passed by RERA were to be complied by the Corporate Debtor and it was only due to continuation of CIRP against the Corporate Debtor that RERA could not have proceeded further to initiate compliance of its order.(p23)
  • NCLAT in paragraph 6 of the judgment in IBBI v. GTL Infrastructure & Ors. (2023) ibclaw.in 110 NCLAT took the view that IBBI has nothing to do with the litigation between two parties i.e. Financial Creditor and Corporate Debtor whereas in the present case the RERA who had already issued various orders against the Corporate Debtor has to do with the corporate debtor and was directly involved with the enforcement of the RERA Act qua the Corporate Debtor hence the judgment in the case of IBBI (supra) is clearly distinguishable.(p23)
  • In view of the sequence and events of the facts which took place and various proceedings drawn by RERA much prior to issuance of notice under Section 8 of the Code by the Operational Creditor, we are satisfied that Appeal filed by the RERA cannot be thrown out on the ground of locus. The RERA held to be aggrieved person within the meaning of Section 61 of the Code.(p25)
  • Thus, the Question No. I has to be answered in affirmative holding that RERA has locus to file Company Appeal (AT) Ins. No. 1172-1173 of 2022.(p26)

B. Question No. II Whether Aquacity Consumer and Societies Welfare Society has locus to file Appeal within the meaning of Section 61 of the Code?

  • Appellant being association of the home-buyers of Real Estate Project who has already initiated proceedings for direction of the interest of the home-buyers is aggrieved person within the meaning of Section 61 of the Code and the Appeal filed by the Appellant cannot be dismissed on the ground of locus.(p27)
  • NCLAT answers Question No. II in affirmative holding that Aquacity Consumer and Social Welfare Society has a locus to file an Appeal under Section 61 of the Code against the Order dated 05th August, 2022.(p28)

C. Question No. III Whether Barter Transaction falls under definition of Operational Debt under IBC?

  • There are nine Barter Agreements between the parties beginning from 29.09.2010 and last being 13.08.2019. Barter Agreement is entered between DB Corporation Ltd. and AG8 Ventures Ltd. which is executed on stamp duty of Rs. 1000.(p32)
  • From the definition of claim under Section 3(6) of IBC it is clear that both sub-clause ‘(a)’ and ‘(b)’ refers to “a right to payment”. The claim must subsist for a debt being debt to become operational debt must relate to a right to payment unless operational creditor has a claim i.e. a right to payment against the corporate debtor, no operational debt can arise to enable Operational Creditor to initiate proceeding under Section 9 of the Code.(p41)
  • The claim of Section 8 and Section 9 also indicates that proceedings under Section 9 by Operational Creditor can be initiated for payment of unpaid operational debt. Section 8(1) uses expression “demanding payment of the amount involved in the default” whereas Section 8(2)(b) uses the expression “the payment of unpaid operational debt” thus non-payment of operational debt is sine qua non for giving any demand notice under Section 8 of the Code leading to Section 9 also makes it clear that after the expiry of period of 10 days from the date of delivery of notice, sub-section 1 of Section 8 of the Code states if the Operational Creditor does not receive payment from the Corporate Debtor, operational Creditor may file an application for initiating a CIRP, thus not receiving the payment from the Corporate Debtor is a condition precedent for initiating Section 9 Application.(p41)
  • Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jaypee Kensington Boulevard Apartments Welfare Association and Ors. NBCC (India) Ltd. & Ors. (2021) ibclaw.in 63 SC held that expression payment only refers to the payment of money and not anything of its equivalent in nature of Barter; when construing the same expression of payment in Section 30(2), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that payment refers only to payment of money and not anything of its equivalent in the nature of Barter, the same interpretation has to be put to Section 8 and 9 also of the Code.(p47)
  • There was no operational debt due on the corporate debtor on which operational creditor can claim payment of money from the corporate debtor to enable it to issue a demand notice under Section 8 or to file Section 9 Application before the Adjudicating Authority. Entire initiation of proceedings under Section 9 by the Operational Creditor is contrary to the scheme of IBC and no payment of money was due on the corporate debtor on basis of which unpaid dues any proceedings under Section 9 can be initiated.(p49)
  • On the basis of Barter Agreement and consequent invoices, non-discharge of Barter Component by the Corporate Debtor shall not lead to any operational debt on basis of which payment of money can be demanded by the Operational Creditor from the Corporate Debtor. No operational debt was owed to the Operational Creditor in the facts of the present case hence initiation of proceedings under Section 9 by the Operational Creditor was contrary to the provisions of the IBC.(p50)

D. Question No. IV & V

  • While considering Question No III it has already been held that there was no Operational Debt due on the Corporate Debtor and the proceedings initiated by the Operational Creditor being wholly outside Section 8 and 9 of the Code, no necessity to enter into Question No. IV & V for the purpose of the present case.(p51)

E. Conclusion

NCLAT concludes that:

  • Application filed under Section 9 by the Operational Creditor alleging Operational Debt was non-maintainable since there was no operational debt on basis of which payment of money could have been demanded by the Operational Creditor from the Corporate Debtor on account of non-discharge of Barter Component by the Corporate Debtor. At best, the Applicant was entitled for claiming allotment of units as per the Barter Agreement between the parties for which it was open for the Operational Creditor to take such remedy as permissible.(p52)
  • However, Section 9 Application was clearly not maintainable, the Adjudicating Authority committed error in admitting Section 9 Application without adverting to the real nature of the transaction between the parties, which is the very basis of the Section 9 Application, the Order of the Adjudicating Authority just is unsustainable.(p52)
  • In result, we allow both the appeals, set aside the Order dated 05th August, 2022 admitting Section 9 Application. Both the Appeals having been allowed, no orders are necessary in different IAs, as noted above. The IAs are disposed of. Parties shall bear their own costs.(p53)

Source :- https://ibclaw.in/real-estate-regulatory-authority-v-d-b-corp-ltd-anr-nclat-new-delhi/

NCLAT New Delhi- RERA Authority also has locus to challenge in appeal against CIRP initiation Order under Sec. 61 of IBC before NCLAT.

 IN THE NATIONAL COMPANY LAW APPELLATE TRIBUNAL

Principal Bench, New Delhi

Real Estate Regulatory Authority
v.
D.B. Corp Ltd. & Anr.

Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 1172-1173 of 2022 with 1321 of 2022
Decided on 08-Dec-23

Brief about the decision:

Facts of the case

  • Corporate Debtor entered into Barter Agreement with Operational Creditor for extensive advertising campaign of its projects. Pursuant to the Agreement, the Operational Creditor was to publish Advertisement for consideration which included cash component and Barter Component. The Cash Component against the advertising was to the paid and the Barter Component was to be utilized in form of allotment of units which were required to be transferred in favour of the Operational Creditor.
  • The RERA received various complaints from allottees of the Corporate Debtor, which complaints were entertained and various orders related to different projects were passed in the year 2020-21 directing the Corporate Debtor to refund the amount along with compensation to various complainants. RERA also passed an order on 18.08.2021 under Section 35 of the RERA Act, 2016 to investigate about the diversion of funds from the designated account.
  • Orders were also passed on 23.03.2022 by RERA revoking the registration of real estate project ‘Aakriti Business Arcade’ and directing for appointment of an agency for completion of the said project under Section 8 of the RERA Act, 2016.
  • An application under Section 9 was filed by the Operational Creditor before the Adjudicating Authority on 02.02.2022 claiming default of operational debt of Rs.10,77,17,000/- with interest consequent to the Barter Agreement entered between the Operational Creditor and the Corporate Debtor and same has been admitted by Adjudicating Authority (NCLT), Indore Bench, Court No.1.
  • Appellants herein Regulatory Authority(RERA) constituted under Section 20 of the RERA Act, 2016, Interim Resolution Professional and Aquacity Consumer and Societies Welfare Society’ which claim to be association of 74 homebuyers have challenged the CIRP admission order under Sec. 9 of IBC of NCLT.
  • The Appellant, Aquacity Consumer and Societies Welfare Society claiming to be a society of homebuyers claimed to have filed two consumer complaints under Section 12(1)(b) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 for its members/homebuyers. The NCDRC allowed both the Consumer Complaints and directed the Corporate Debtor to refund the amount collected from the homebuyers along with interest of 9% pa from the date of possession. Civil Appeals were filed before the Hon’ble Supreme Court by the Appellant Association for modification of the order of NCDRC to the extent that the interest should be from the date of payment and not from the date of possession. In the Appeals notices were issued.


Decision of the Appellate Tribunal

A. Question No. I: Whether RERA has locus to challenge CIRP admission order before NCLAT?

  • Section 61 of the Code, 2016 provides for an Appeal by “any person aggrieved by the Order of the Adjudicating Authority”. Section 61, sub- Section (1) uses the expression “any person aggrieved”.(p12)
  • RERA is a statutory authority under Section 20 sub-section (2). RERA is a body corporate and is entitled to sue or to be sued in its name. RERA is thus fully competent to sue in its name. Question of locus to file an Appeal as an aggrieved person and the question as to whether appeal filed by the aggrieved person is to succeed, are two different questions and the question of locus is not dependent on success of the grounds in the Appeal.(p18)
  • In the present case the RERA has taken various actions against the Corporate Debtor and various orders passed by RERA were to be complied by the Corporate Debtor and it was only due to continuation of CIRP against the Corporate Debtor that RERA could not have proceeded further to initiate compliance of its order.(p23)
  • NCLAT in paragraph 6 of the judgment in IBBI v. GTL Infrastructure & Ors. (2023) ibclaw.in 110 NCLAT took the view that IBBI has nothing to do with the litigation between two parties i.e. Financial Creditor and Corporate Debtor whereas in the present case the RERA who had already issued various orders against the Corporate Debtor has to do with the corporate debtor and was directly involved with the enforcement of the RERA Act qua the Corporate Debtor hence the judgment in the case of IBBI (supra) is clearly distinguishable.(p23)
  • In view of the sequence and events of the facts which took place and various proceedings drawn by RERA much prior to issuance of notice under Section 8 of the Code by the Operational Creditor, we are satisfied that Appeal filed by the RERA cannot be thrown out on the ground of locus. The RERA held to be aggrieved person within the meaning of Section 61 of the Code.(p25)
  • Thus, the Question No. I has to be answered in affirmative holding that RERA has locus to file Company Appeal (AT) Ins. No. 1172-1173 of 2022.(p26)

B. Question No. II Whether Aquacity Consumer and Societies Welfare Society has locus to file Appeal within the meaning of Section 61 of the Code?

  • Appellant being association of the home-buyers of Real Estate Project who has already initiated proceedings for direction of the interest of the home-buyers is aggrieved person within the meaning of Section 61 of the Code and the Appeal filed by the Appellant cannot be dismissed on the ground of locus.(p27)
  • NCLAT answers Question No. II in affirmative holding that Aquacity Consumer and Social Welfare Society has a locus to file an Appeal under Section 61 of the Code against the Order dated 05th August, 2022.(p28)

C. Question No. III Whether Barter Transaction falls under definition of Operational Debt under IBC?

  • There are nine Barter Agreements between the parties beginning from 29.09.2010 and last being 13.08.2019. Barter Agreement is entered between DB Corporation Ltd. and AG8 Ventures Ltd. which is executed on stamp duty of Rs. 1000.(p32)
  • From the definition of claim under Section 3(6) of IBC it is clear that both sub-clause ‘(a)’ and ‘(b)’ refers to “a right to payment”. The claim must subsist for a debt being debt to become operational debt must relate to a right to payment unless operational creditor has a claim i.e. a right to payment against the corporate debtor, no operational debt can arise to enable Operational Creditor to initiate proceeding under Section 9 of the Code.(p41)
  • The claim of Section 8 and Section 9 also indicates that proceedings under Section 9 by Operational Creditor can be initiated for payment of unpaid operational debt. Section 8(1) uses expression “demanding payment of the amount involved in the default” whereas Section 8(2)(b) uses the expression “the payment of unpaid operational debt” thus non-payment of operational debt is sine qua non for giving any demand notice under Section 8 of the Code leading to Section 9 also makes it clear that after the expiry of period of 10 days from the date of delivery of notice, sub-section 1 of Section 8 of the Code states if the Operational Creditor does not receive payment from the Corporate Debtor, operational Creditor may file an application for initiating a CIRP, thus not receiving the payment from the Corporate Debtor is a condition precedent for initiating Section 9 Application.(p41)
  • Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jaypee Kensington Boulevard Apartments Welfare Association and Ors. NBCC (India) Ltd. & Ors. (2021) ibclaw.in 63 SC held that expression payment only refers to the payment of money and not anything of its equivalent in nature of Barter; when construing the same expression of payment in Section 30(2), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that payment refers only to payment of money and not anything of its equivalent in the nature of Barter, the same interpretation has to be put to Section 8 and 9 also of the Code.(p47)
  • There was no operational debt due on the corporate debtor on which operational creditor can claim payment of money from the corporate debtor to enable it to issue a demand notice under Section 8 or to file Section 9 Application before the Adjudicating Authority. Entire initiation of proceedings under Section 9 by the Operational Creditor is contrary to the scheme of IBC and no payment of money was due on the corporate debtor on basis of which unpaid dues any proceedings under Section 9 can be initiated.(p49)
  • On the basis of Barter Agreement and consequent invoices, non-discharge of Barter Component by the Corporate Debtor shall not lead to any operational debt on basis of which payment of money can be demanded by the Operational Creditor from the Corporate Debtor. No operational debt was owed to the Operational Creditor in the facts of the present case hence initiation of proceedings under Section 9 by the Operational Creditor was contrary to the provisions of the IBC.(p50)

D. Question No. IV & V

  • While considering Question No III it has already been held that there was no Operational Debt due on the Corporate Debtor and the proceedings initiated by the Operational Creditor being wholly outside Section 8 and 9 of the Code, no necessity to enter into Question No. IV & V for the purpose of the present case.(p51)

E. Conclusion

NCLAT concludes that:

  • Application filed under Section 9 by the Operational Creditor alleging Operational Debt was non-maintainable since there was no operational debt on basis of which payment of money could have been demanded by the Operational Creditor from the Corporate Debtor on account of non-discharge of Barter Component by the Corporate Debtor. At best, the Applicant was entitled for claiming allotment of units as per the Barter Agreement between the parties for which it was open for the Operational Creditor to take such remedy as permissible.(p52)
  • However, Section 9 Application was clearly not maintainable, the Adjudicating Authority committed error in admitting Section 9 Application without adverting to the real nature of the transaction between the parties, which is the very basis of the Section 9 Application, the Order of the Adjudicating Authority just is unsustainable.(p52)
  • In result, we allow both the appeals, set aside the Order dated 05th August, 2022 admitting Section 9 Application. Both the Appeals having been allowed, no orders are necessary in different IAs, as noted above. The IAs are disposed of. Parties shall bear their own costs.(p53)

Source :- https://ibclaw.in/real-estate-regulatory-authority-v-d-b-corp-ltd-anr-nclat-new-delhi/

Friday, 11 February 2022

Supreme Court : Even after a petition under Section 7 of the IBC is admitted and before the Committee of Creditors is formed, the parties can settle the dispute

 Supreme Court : Swiss Ribbons Pvt Ltd and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors (2019) 4 SCC 17

Even after a petition under Section 7 of the IBC is admitted and before the Committee of Creditors is formed, the parties can settle the dispute. Further, even after the CoC is formed, Section 12A of the IBC does provide for a mechanism through which the petition can be withdrawn (if the parties were to reach a settlement);

Supreme Court : NCLT can not dismiss the petition on the basis that the corporate debtor has initiated the process of settlement with the financial creditors

 Supreme Court :ES Krishnamurthy v. M/S Bharath Hi Tech Builders Pvt Ltd.,

the legal issue before the apex court was whether the NCLT can, without applying its mind to the merits of the petition under Section 7, simply dismiss the petition on the basis that the corporate debtor has initiated the process of settlement with the financial creditors.

The Court found that the NCLT and NCLAT had abdicated their jurisdiction to decide a petition under Section 7 by directing the respondent to settle the remaining claims within three months, noting that such a course of action is not contemplated under the IBC except either admit or reject an application respectively contemplating occurrence of debt and default.

The Bench stated that while settlements can be encouraged by the NCLT and NCLAT to achieve the objectives of the IBC, however, "they cannot direct them by acting as courts of equity."

Tuesday, 13 April 2021

Decree holder cannot be classified as a financial creditor for the purpose of initiating Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (“CIRP”) under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“IBC”)

 The National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi (“NCLAT”) has in its judgment dated August 14, 2020 (“Judgment”) in the matter of Sushil Ansal v. Ashok Tripathi and Others [Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 452 of 2020], held that a decree holder cannot be classified as a financial creditor for the purpose of initiating Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (“CIRP”) under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“IBC”).

Facts

Brief facts of the case are that 

  • on August 5, 2014, one Mr. Ashok Tripathi (“Respondent No. 1”) and Mr. Saurabh Tripathi (“Respondent No. 2”) (collectively, “Respondents”) had jointly booked a unit bearing No. 0073, admeasuring 3746 sq. ft., with M/s. Ansal Properties and Infrastructure Limited (“Corporate Debtor”) in one of their real estate projects namely, Sushant Golf City, in Lucknow, for a total consideration of INR 1,62,43,133/- by paying an amount of INR 8,37,300/- towards booking advance. 
  • In a separate transaction, Respondent No. 2 had on July 16, 2014, booked another unit bearing No. B7/GF/01, admeasuring 1229 sq. ft. in the same project, by paying an amount of INR 1,63,994/- as booking advance. A joint “built up agreement/builder buyer agreement” dated September 12, 2014, in respect of the unit bearing No. 0073 and a “Flat Buyer Agreement” dated September 28, 2014 in respect of the unit bearing No. B7/GF/01 was executed between the respective Respondents with the Corporate Debtor. Pursuant to execution of the aforementioned agreements, allotment letters pertaining to the said units were issued by the Corporate Debtor to each of the Respondents.
  • The Corporate Debtor undertook to complete the construction of the said units and to deliver possession thereof to the said Respondents within 2 years from the date of commencement of construction. Since the project commencement date notified on the website of RERA was September 22, 2015, the Corporate Debtor was required to deliver possession of the unit bearing No. 0073 to both the Respondents by September 22, 2017 and deliver possession of the unit bearing No. B7/GF/01 to the Respondent No. 2 within 36 months from the date of the building plan being sanctioned. 
  • However, even after the passing of 5 years of the aforementioned time frame, the Corporate Debtor failed to complete the construction of the said units or refund the amounts paid as booking advance, to the Respondents.
  • Whether this is a fit case for invoking Rule 11 of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal Rules, 2016 (“NCLAT Rules”) to allow the parties to settle the dispute?
  • Whether the application filed by the Respondents under Section 7 of the IBC was not maintainable?
  • The NCLAT observed that a Corporate Debtor was permitted to seek exit from CIRP at the pre-admission stage. It could also seek exit at the post admission stage, but before constitution of the Committee of Creditors. It was manifest that a party to CIRP could approach the adjudicating authority directly for exercise of its inherent powers under Rule 11 of the NCLT Rules, 2016 for withdrawal of the application under Section 7 of the IBC or disposal of such application on the basis of a settlement worked out by the parties. 
  • However, exercise of inherent power on the part of adjudicating authority or even by the NCLAT in appeal would depend on consideration of all relevant facts of the case. The adjudicating authority or the appellate tribunal would have to keep in view the interest of various stakeholders and claimants before allowing such withdrawal or settlement. 
  • Admittedly, the interim resolution professional had received 283 claims against the Corporate Debtor from allottees of different projects, financial creditors, operational creditors, other creditors and employees. The Settlement Deed executed between the Respondents and the Corporate Debtor did not take into consideration the interest of such other claimants. Therefore, allowing the withdrawal of application under Section 7 of the IBC on the basis of such settlement between the Respondents and the Corporate Debtor was not all-encompassing and detrimental to the interests of the other claimants, including the other allottees, and accordingly would not be in consonance with the object of the IBC and the purpose of invoking of Rule 11 of the NCLAT Rules.
  • With respect to maintainability of the application under Section 7 of the IBC, the NCLAT observed that the dictum of law was loud and clear. An application for initiating CIRP against the Corporate Debtor by allottees under a real estate project was required to be filed jointly by not less than one hundred of such allottees or not less than 10% of the total number of such allottees under the same real estate project. It is therefore clear that an application at the instance of a single allottee or by a group of allottees falling short of the prescribed threshold limit would not be maintainable.

Aggrieved by the above, the Respondents lodged a complaint before the Uttar Pradesh Real Estate Regulatory Authority (“UP RERA”) to establish the existence of a financial debt and liability of the Corporate Debtor to the tune of INR 73,35,686.43. Pursuant to this, on November 16, 2017, the UP RERA directed the Corporate Debtor to refund the amount repayable to the Respondents with respect to the unit bearing No. 0073 in 6 instalments within a period of 9 months. Subsequently, on December 13, 2018, the UP RERA further directed the Corporate Debtor to refund the amount paid with respect to the unit bearing No. B7/GF/01 to Respondent No.2 in 10 monthly instalments along with interest. 

Consequently, a Recovery Certificate dated August 10, 2019 (“Recovery Certificate”) was issued by the UP RERA in this regard and forwarded to the concerned authority for effecting the recovery of INR 73,35,686.43 from the Corporate Debtor. However, the Respondents chose to file an application under Section 7 of the IBC for initiation of CIRP before the National Company Law Tribunal, New Delhi (“NCLT”) even though they were entitled to seek disbursement of the above mentioned amount of INR 73,35,686.43 from UP RERA upon its recovery.

The NCLT observed that the claim of the allottees had arisen out of the aforementioned orders and Recovery Certificate issued by the UP RERA and termed such claim as an ‘adjudicated debt’. It therefore held that the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Ordinance, 2019 (“Ordinance”) promulgated on December 28, 2019, which prescribes a minimum threshold limit of not less than 100 allottees or not less than 10% of the total number of allottees under the same real estate project, whichever is less, for initiation of CIRP at the instance of allottees of a real estate project, was not attracted in the present case, as the Respondents went before the NCLT as decree-holders and not as allottees. Thus, the NCLT, vide its impugned order dated March 17, 2020 (“NCLT Order”), admitted the application of the Respondents for initiating CIRP. Aggrieved by the said NCLT Order, Mr. Sushil Ansal, a former director and shareholder of the Corporate Debtor (“Appellant”), filed the present appeal before the NCLAT.

Issues


Arguments

Contentions raised by the Appellant:

The Appellant inter alia contended that the application filed by the Respondents under Section 7 of the IBC was not maintainable as the Respondents did not meet the required criteria of either constituting 100 allottees or 10% of the total allottees as mandated under the Ordinance, and therefore were ineligible to by themselves file an application under Section 7 of the IBC for initiation of CIRP against the Corporate Debtor. The Appellant argued that the Ordinance was promulgated and came into force during the pendency of the applications filed by the Respondents before the NCLT and therefore the NCLT should have insisted upon compliance with the mandate under the Ordinance regarding the threshold limit before proceeding to pass the impugned order. It was further argued that the Ordinance was followed by the passing of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2020 (“Amendment Act”) which incorporated the provisions of the Ordinance, and in effect crystallised the legal position pertaining to eligibility for initiating of CIRP, and therefore the application filed by the Respondents under Section 7 was not maintainable. It was also urged that classification of allottees as Financial Creditors was not permissible and merely because the Respondents had obtained a RERA decree in their favour, it did not alter their status. Therefore, the finding recorded by the NCLT that the allottees who have obtained a decree in their favour would not be hit by the requirement of threshold limit under the Ordinance followed by the Amendment Act was flawed. It was further submitted that the dispute stood settled between the Corporate Debtor and the Respondents in terms of an amicable settlement between the parties pursuant to which they had filed a joint application for withdrawal and termination of CIRP of the Corporate Debtor.

Contentions raised by the Respondents:

The Respondents on the other hand contended that they had settled all their disputes with the Appellant in relation to the unit bearing no. 0073 and they do not have any pending claims against the Corporate Debtor. The Respondents accordingly prayed for invoking Rule 11 of the NCLAT Rules to set aside the order of admission and terminate the CIRP against the Corporate Debtor. It was further submitted that the dispute was settled prior to constitution of a committee of creditors and therefore there was no legal impediment in allowing such settlement and permit withdrawal and termination of CIRP. In so far as the claims of other home buyers/ creditors was concerned, it was submitted that they could pursue their claims independently on their own merits through any remedy as may be available under law. As regards the instant appeal, it was submitted that the Respondents did not wish to contest the issue raised by the Appellant regarding maintainability of the application under Section 7 filed by them and, therefore, agreed and subscribed to the arguments advanced by the Appellant.

Observations of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi:

It was further observed by the NCLAT that, the Respondents’ contention of coming within the purview of ‘financial creditors’ rested on strength of the definition of ‘creditor’ in terms of the provision under Section 3(10) of the IBC which includes a decree-holder within its fold. The question that arose for consideration was whether a decree-holder, though covered under the definition of ‘creditor’, fell within the definition of a ‘financial creditor’ as per of Section 5(7) of the IBC. On a plain reading of the provision, it is clear that ‘Financial Creditor’ encompasses any person to whom a financial debt is due. It would, therefore, be relevant to ascertain the nature of debt styled as ‘financial debt’ within the ambit of Section 5(8) of the IBC. Since the initial transaction was an allotment under a real estate project, there could be no doubt that such transaction had the contours of a borrowing as contemplated under Section 5(8)(f) of the IBC. However, the case set up by the Respondents before the NCLT was not on the strength of a transaction having the commercial effect of a borrowing thereby giving them the status of ‘financial creditors’ but on the strength of being ‘decree-holders’. It was noted that, the Respondents had staked claim as ‘decree-holders’ before the NCLT and therefore they could not later claim to be allottees, classifying the amounts raised from them to have the commercial effect of a borrowing, and hence, cloaking them with the capacity of being ‘financial creditors’. Hence, it was required to be determined whether a ‘decree-holder’ could maintain an application under Section 7 as a ‘financial creditor’.

The NCLAT further noted that a ‘decree-holder’ would undoubtedly be covered by the definition of ‘creditor’ under Section 3(10) of the IBC, but cannot be classified as a ‘Financial Creditor’, unless the debt was disbursed against the consideration for time value of money or falls within any of the provisions thereof, as the definition of ‘financial debt’ is inclusive in character. In the instant case, RERA had conducted the recovery proceedings at the instance of the Respondents against the Corporate Debtor which culminated in the issuance of the Recovery Certificate and passing of an order directing the concerned authority to recover an amount of INR 73,35,686.43 from the Corporate Debtor as arrears towards land revenue. However, instead of pursuing the matter before the competent authority, the Respondents sought to trigger CIRP against the Corporate Debtor. Therefore, the answer to the question on whether a decree-holder would fall within the definition of ‘Financial Creditor’ in such a scenario had to be an emphatic ‘No’ as the amount claimed under the decree was an adjudicated amount and not a debt disbursed against the consideration for the time value of money and therefore did not fall within the ambit of any of the provisions under Section 5(8) of the IBC. It was indisputable that the Recovery Certificate sought to be executed was the end product of an adjudicatory mechanism under the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016, and realisation of the amount due under the Recovery Certificate tantamount to recovery effected under a money decree, though the mode of execution was slightly different. In view of the aforesaid observations, the NCLAT was of the view that the application of the Respondents under Section 7 of the IBC was not maintainable.

Decision of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi

In allowing the appeal, the NCLAT noted that the Respondents could not claim to be allottees of a real estate project after issuance of the Recovery Certificate by UP RERA directing recovery of INR 73,35,686.43 as arrears towards land revenue. The NCLAT stated that the Respondents were decree-holders seeking execution of money due under the Recovery Certificate, which is impermissible within the ambit of Section 7 of the IBC. Therefore, their application for triggering of CIRP was not maintainable as allottees. Decree-holders, though included in the definition of ‘creditor’, did not fall within the definition of ‘financial creditor’ and hence a ‘decree-holder’ could not seek initiation of CIRP as a ‘financial creditor’.

In view of the conclusion reached and findings on the issues recorded, the NCLAT was of the opinion that the impugned NCLT Order initiating CIRP against the Corporate Debtor was not sustainable. The NCLAT was also of the firm view that the application of Respondents was moved for execution/recovery of the amount due under the Recovery Certificate and not for insolvency resolution of the Corporate Debtor. The NCLAT was of the view that the said NCLT Order suffered from grave legal infirmity and could not be supported and accordingly set it aside.