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Sunday, 16 May 2021

2/3rd majority of allottees, keeping the larger interest of project completion and the interest of all the allottees of the said project, have accorded their consent for transfer of project under Section 15 and extension of project under Section 7(3), the complaint of minority of less than 1/3rd of the allottees for refund under Section 18 is disallowed

 In the Matter of Nitin Soni & Ors. Vs NNP Buildcon LLP Complaint no.CC005000000043692  decided on 07.08.2020 before Maharashtra Real Estate Regulatory Authority 


  • The complainants purchased apartments in a project 

  • The possession was to be granted by the year 2019 but it was not provided hence the complainants sought for refund along with interest and compensation. 

  • The Respondent‘s project has undergone a change of promoter, in March 2019, in accordance with the provisions of Section 15, wherein the erstwhile promoter Riverview Properties Pvt Ltd, has obtained consent of two-third of the allottees in the said project and as per the said consent terms, the project has been taken over by the present promoter i.e. NNP BUILDCON LLP. 

  • The delay in the project was due to change in planning authority, the new planning authority provided commencement certificate in August 2019, no progress was done from 2013 till 2019. 

  • The respondent submitted that a mutually agreed proposal was shared with the allottees of the project including the complainants during discussions before the Conciliation forum. Accordingly, consent of 2/3rd allottees was received. It was also submitted that since the law provides for 2/3rd consent, providing different relief to remaining 1/3rd allottees would go against the provisions of the Act and also would set a wrong precedent for 2/3rd allottees. 

  • Hence, the Complainants prayer of refund under Section 18 of the Act was disallowed by the Authority.

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That Just because home buyers continued to pay even after the promised possession date had lapsed, they had not "acquiesced" and not consented to the delay in possession

 In the Matter of Saurabh Mehrotra Vs.CCI Projects Pvt Ltd Complaint no.CC006000000078611  decided on 06.08.2020  Before Maharashtra Real Estate Regulatory Authority.


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  • The Rivali Park project, rechristened as Wintergreen, has been delayed for more than three years. The developer CCI Projects Ltd had sought last mile funding for the project from the Rs 20,000 crore stress fund created by Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman and the  funds were sanctioned for builder CCI Projects Ltd. 

  • The developer had revised the possession date to December 2019, and further extended it to June 30, 2021.

  • Home buyer had filed complaints seeking relief after the project was delayed. However, The buyer made remaining payments for the flat even after the possession date in their registered agreements had lapsed.

  • Advocate, appearing for the developer, contended that the developer had informed the revised possession dates to the buyers from time to time and they have made payments even after the possession dates had passed. This showed that they had "acquiesced" and had consented to the revised possession dates.

  • However, rejecting the argument, The Court observed that the payments were structured as slab-wise payments, and after investing big amounts, the complainants were helpless and continued making payments in the hope of early possession."Therefore, this conduct of the complainants does not amount to acquiescence. 

  • The Court Observed that “ when the statute imposes strict duty for completing the project as per timeline, and speaks about the consequences of delay, the allottees' consent for condoning the delay must be unequivocal and it must be in writing. No such document is produced before me,".

  • The Plea for granting Delayed Possession charges under Section 18 was granted.

 

In case of respondents’ failure to execute and register the agreement, the Secretary of MahaRERA shall execute and register the agreement on behalf of the respondents at the cost of the complainant.The agreement for sale executed by the Secretary of MahaRERA will be deemed to be the agreement executed by the respondents themselves and shall be binding on them

 In the Matter of Gaurav Makkar Vs.Shining Sun Constructions Complaint no. CC006000000001389 decided on 31.05.2018 before Maharashtra Real Estate Regulatory Authority

Maharashtra Real Estate Regulatory Authority directed the Secretary of Maha RERA to execute and register the agreement of sale on behalf of the respondents at the cost of the complainant.


MahaRERA, said, “In case of respondents’ failure to execute and register the agreement, the Secretary of MahaRERA shall execute and register the agreement on behalf of the respondents at the cost of the complainant.”


“The agreement for sale executed by the Secretary of MahaRERA will be deemed to be the agreement executed by the respondents themselves and shall be binding on them”, he added


Later on June 26, 2018, respondent executed the agreement hence, the proceeding is terminated as the complainant’s claim is fully satisfied.


Gaurav Makkar (complainant) filed a case against Shining Sun Constructions (Marble Arch) respondent on March 23, 2018, the complainant complains that he has booked flat no. 702 in respondents’ registered project Marble Arch situated in Sector 14 Panchanand, Taloja, New Bombay. Though the respondents received more than 10% of the total consideration of the flat, they failed to execute the agreement for sale in complainant’s favour and thereby contravened Section 13 of Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act,2016 (RERA.)


The complaint was decided on  March 23, 2018. The respondents have been directed to execute the agreement for sale in complainant’s favour of flat no.702, Marble Arch situated at Plot no. 104, Sector-14, Panchnand, Taloja, Navi Mumbai by end of March 2018 and also to pay her Rs. 20,000/- towards the cost of the complaint. A penalty of Rs. 50,000 is also imposed u/s 61 of RERA.


The Judge said the complainant complains that the respondents have not complied with the order. Hence it requests to execute/enforce the same.

Complainant is stopped from denying/withdrawing his consent given for the re-planning of the building ,the Complainant's claim for withdrawal after accepting the offer is not maintainable.

 In The Matter of Sunil Wadhwani v. Pashmina Realty Private Limited Complaint number CC006000000078745 Decided on 07.01.2020 before Maharashtra Real Estate Regulatory Authority

  • The Complainant had booked flat no. C-701 having carpet area of 1,436 square feet consisting of 4 (four) bedrooms in the Respondent's project 'Pashmina Lotus' situated at Chandivali, Powai ("the Original Flat"), at and for a consideration of Rs. 2,76,00,000/-.

  • The Respondent agreed to handover possession of the Original Flat by 30th September, 2016. However, the project was not viable, the plans were revised and two bedroom and three-bedroom flats were proposed to be constructed with the consent of 2/3rd (two-third) allottees of the project including the Complainant. 

  • A new development manager was brought in and the development was rebranded and re-registered under RERA under a new name.

  • The Complainant gave express consent for the change in plan on 27th December, 2017 in the form of consent terms ("Consent Letter") whereby the Complainant has given consent to two flats being flat no. B-1104 admeasuring 770 square feet carpet area and flat no. A-1101 admeasuring 812 square feet carpet area ("New Flats") and gave consent for re-planning the building under Section 14(2) of RERA.

  • After the Consent, the Complainant sought refund of his amount with interest under Section 18 of the RERA claiming that the Respondent failed to hand over the possession of the Original Flat on the agreed date.


Issue:

  • Whether the Complainant is stopped from denying/withdrawing his consent given for the re-planning of the building?


Observations of Maha-RERA:


  • The consent under Section 14(2) of RERA of 2/3rd (two-third) allottees for re-planning has been given to the Respondent and the Respondent has revised the plans. The Respondent is ready to execute the agreements of the flats revised by them i.e. New Flats. Not only that, in terms of the Consent Letter, the Complainant has given his consent to accept the New Flats each consisting of two bedrooms in lieu of the Original Flat consisting of four bedrooms. The Complainant also showed his readiness to pay Rs. 20,00,000/- for additional carpet area which he is going to obtain. These facts, therefore, establish that on the consent of the Complainant, the Respondent has acted to its dis-advantage and hence, the Complainant is estopped under Section 115 of the Evidence Act from withdrawing his consent and his status as an allottee of the New Flats.


  • In context of the aforesaid, Maha-RERA observed that provisions of Section 62 of the Contract Act can also be pressed into service, which Section 62 reads as follows:

"62. If the parties to a contract agree to substitute a new contract for it, or to rescind or alter it, the original contract need not be performed."


  • Maha-RERA also relied upon the observation made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the context of Section 62 of the Contract Act in Lata Construction and Others v. Dr. Rameshchandra Ramniklal Shah (2001)1 SCC 586 whereby it was observed:

"Section 62 of the Contract Act contains the principle of "Novation" of contract. One of the essential requirements of "Novation", as contemplated by Section 62, is that there should be complete substitution of a new contract in place of the old. It is in that situation that the original contract need not be performed. Substitution of a new contract in place of the old contract which would have the effect of rescinding or completely altering the terms of the original contract, has to be by agreement between the parties. A substituted contract should rescind or alter or extinguish the previous contract. But if the terms of the two contracts are inconsistent and they cannot stand together, the subsequent contract cannot be in substitution of the earlier contract."


Order of the Maha-RERA:


After considering the facts and circumstances of the case, Maha-RERA found that there is novation of the contract and only a formal contract in writing is to be executed. The consideration of the Original Flat is to be adjusted against the New Flats, otherwise the terms and conditions are similar. In view of the same, the Complainant's claim for withdrawal is not maintainable and the same is dismissed.


Maha-RERA, in order to avoid multiplicity of the proceedings, in the capacity of the regulator, directed the parties to enter and register the agreement for sale of New Flats in consonance with terms and the conditions of the Consent Letter and the Previous Agreement within period of 1 (one) month.


RERA to have jurisdiction even where agreement for sale is cancelled prior to RERA ; Scope of RERA also extends to disputes arising prior to RERA, where consideration paid to developers was still with them, even after RERA came into force

 In the Matter of Champatlal Jain, Parvin Dumasia and 6 Others vs Suriti Developers Private Limited Complaint no. decided on 04.06.2018 Before Maharashtra Real Estate Regulatory Authority

The Complainants had purchased apartments in Respondent's project Universal Paradise in Mumbai, between 2007 and 2013.The Complainants stated that registered agreements for sale (Agreements for Sale) were entered into with the Respondent for purchasing the apartments and that sometime in February 2017, the Respondent unilaterally cancelled the Agreements for Sale. Aggrieved by the termination notices, the Complainants approached the MahaRERA seeking that the Agreements for Sale ought to be declared valid, legal, subsisting and binding.


The Complaint was disposed of by the MahaRERA stating That though the Agreements for Sale were cancelled by the Respondent before the RERA came into force, in view of the fact that the consideration paid by the Complainants was still with the Respondent, the MahaRERA had complete jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate the complaint. if the Complainants chose to continue, both parties should execute the Agreements for Sale in accordance with Section 13 of the RERA and in addition, do so within 45 (forty-five) days from the date of the Order.


The Order has clarified that the scope of RERA also extends to disputes arising prior to RERA, where consideration paid to developers was still with them, after RERA came into force.

The cause of action for claiming possession after the lapse of agreed date of possession becomes a recurring course of action

 In the Matter of Avinash Saraf, Neha Duggar Saraf v/s Runwal Homes Pvt. Ltd. Complaint number CC006000000000032 decided on 13.10.2017 before Maharashtra Real Estate Regulatory Authority


The complainants contended that they have paid 97% of total consideration of the flat. The date of possession of the flat was August, 2016, as per agreement of sale executed in November 2014, but the respondent failed to give the Possession in time.hence the complainant demanded the amount of consideration with interest @ 21% p.a. from the respondent with compensation for the amount expended towards stamp duty and registration charges.


The respondent contended that MAHARERA has come into effect from 1st May 2017. Therefore MAHARERA has no jurisdiction to entertain this complaint. The date of possession was delayed due to delay in getting permission for constructing parking from MCGM (Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai), for reasons beyond control of the respondent.


Point for consideration before The Honorable judge was whether the complainant is entitled to get back the amount paid to respondent with interest and compensation? He answered affirmatively with the following reasons.


The cause of action for claiming possession after the lapse of agreed date of possession becomes a recurring course of action. Therefore MAHARERA has the jurisdiction under section 79 of the Act. The reasons given by the respondent for delay in possession is also not acceptable, since the agreement was executed in November 2014 it means the respondent was aware of the time for giving possession.


The honorable judge has delivered the following judgment.

  • To refund the entire amount paid to the respondent till date with interest and compensation for amount paid towards stamp duty and registration charges. Rate of interest upto the date of 30th April 2017 was decided @  9% per annum. And from 1st May 2017 the rate of interest was decided to be the interest at SBI’s highest marginal cost of lending rate + 2% p.a. till the date of final payment to the complainant.

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Even when the Agreement does not contain the Date of Possession the Complaint is maintainable for refund. when no date of possession is mentioned in the agreement the Promoter is expected to hand over the possession within reasonable time.

 In the Matter of Vrajesh Hirjee v/s Skyline Construction Company Complaint number CC006000000057101 decided on 21.02.2019

the matter was before Maharashtra Real Estate Regulatory Authority

Parties have entered into agreement for sale but there is no mention of the date of possession. The learned advocate of the respondents therefore submits that  the date of possession is kept blank with the consent of the Parties and no date of possession was agreed upon The respondents have pleaded not guilty and have filed their reply to contend that the complaint is not maintainable because there is no agreed date of possession mentioned in the agreement


According to the Honorable court Section 13(2) of RERA  the promoter is liable to enter into a written agreement for sale and mention in it the date by which the possession of the flat is to be handed over to the Purchaser, Hence, the respondents cannot take disadvantage of their own wrong. In this case the Honorable court relied upon the matter of Fortune Infrastructure-v/s-Travor D'lima (2018) 5 SCC 442 so The respondents were directed to pay the aforesaid amount with simple interest at the rate of 10 55% per annum from the date of receipt till their repayment.

The Complaint to the Authority can be filed by any of the Co Purchasers, when there is no conflict of interest between the co-purchasers and Even after having an arbitration clause in agreement the authority has power to entertain the plea when no request is made for arbitration by the parties.

 in the Matter of Ganesh Lonkar V/s D.S. Kulkarni Developers Ltd. Complaint number CC005000000000317 Decided on 26/12/2017


There are 2 important legal issues involved in this complaint filed under section 18 of Real Estate(regulation and Development) Act 2016.

  • Whether the Arbitration Agreement will oust the jurisdiction of Maha RERA and

  • Whether the complaint filed by a co-purchaser is maintainable?, 

The complainant contends that he and his wife Mrs. Sharmila booked a flat no. 4-602 in DSK Mayurban, situated at Pune and the respondents promised to give its possession on or before 30th June 2017. The respondents have failed to deliver the possession of the flat on the agreed date. The complainant wants to continue in the project. According to him, as per the registered agreement for sale, the respondents are supposed to make payment of pre-EMIs of housing loan taken from Tata Capital Housing Finance Ltd. (TCHFL ) till the possession of the flat is handed over. TCHFL has issued notices to the complainant for payment of EMIs after 30th June 2017. Therefore, the complainant prays that the respondents be directed to hand over the possession of their flat at the earliest and to pay EMIs from December 2016 onwards. Complaint also claims interest on the amount paid by him to the respondents. 

The respondents have pleaded not guilty and they have filed their explanation to contend that co-purchaser Mrs. Sharmila Ganesh Loankar has not been added as a party to this complaint. The respondents have further contended that as per clause 49 in the agreement for sale, this dispute is to be referred to the Arbitrator and therefore, this authority has no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the present dispute.

Maha RERA observed that 

  • there is no substance in the objection on non-joinder because there is no conflict of interest between the co-purchasers. 

  • Here in this case though there is a clause to refer the dispute to the Arbitrator, neither the complainant nor respondents have submitted any application before this authority to refer their matter to the Arbitrator, hence RERA have jurisdiction to the case.



If the Redevelopment project involves the Sale of flats to outside parties, then the builder becomes promoter under the act and the project is to be registered

 In the Matter of Indira Nagar Kaveri Apartments Owners Welfare Association v/s Navin Housing & Properties Pvt. Ltd. Complaint number 433/2019 ,


The Hon’ble Tamil Nadu  Real Estate Regulatory Authority observed that 

  • an Agreement between existing flat owners and Builder intending to do redevelopment of the Society where the sale of flat to outside parties are also involved., “Very much constitute the standard joint development agreement for redevelopment  which is entered into between the existing flat owners and the promoter builder for demolition of the existing flats and construction of new flats in the said property. Therefore the day existing flat owners sign the deed of agreement with the promoter builder, the existing flat owners become an allottee and the respondent builder becomes the promoter under this act.”


  • The Hon’ble Tribunal further added that it is the responsibility of the promoter to get the consent from the remaining flat owners to take up the redevelopment project.


  • The Hon’ble Tribunal further declined to transfer the matter for arbitration adding that  “after the commencement of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) act, 2016 the real estate disputes and complaints will have to be adjudicated by the authority constituted under the act.” 


Thursday, 13 May 2021

Section 12 Refund - Developer to deal with Bank Directly in case of Refund in Subvention Scheme

 In the Matter of Mohan Vamsi Vs M/s Dewan housing Finance  ( Complaint no. CC006000000193176) the Maharashtra Real Estate Regulatory Authority has Ruled that


In Case of Refund in the Project where the Subvention Scheme is involved, the Builder has to deal directly with the bank and to return the money taken under Subvention scheme. The Complainant will have not  have any role between the builder and the bank.


 In the Earlier matter of khyati shah v/s rajsanket realty limited Complaint number CC006000000141031 Decided on 08/01/2020

The Complainant Filed the complaint seeking directions to the respondent to refund the entire amount paid by the complainant along with interest under the provision of section 18. The complainant purchased the flat in respondent’s project under the Subvention scheme whereby paying 20% of total amount 1,98,14,750/- . Agreement to sale was also registered on 06/09/2013. Out of The remaining amount 75% was to be paid by the ICICI bank immediately on registration of agreement to sale and balance 5% on the Possession of the flat. The interest on that amount in the form of PRE-EMIs was to be paid by the respondent builder.

Date of Possession was not mentioned in the agreement of sale. The respondent builder in contravention of the agreement stopped paying pre-emi to the Icici bank so icici issued several demand letters to the complainant to pay the pending amount.

The honourable tribunal observed that “the date of possession was not mentioned in the agreement for sale but the respondent no. 1 agreed to pay the monthly EMI to the respondent no. 2 till the possession is given to the complainant. since it has stopped paying EMI from march,2019 the same can be taken as the date of possession, Hence the complainant, who is an allottee is entitled to seek relief under section 18 of the RERA and the refund sought by the complainant, under section 18 is justified.”

The Honourable tribunal further added that “ The respondent number 1 ( The builder) is further directed to deal with the bank under subvention scheme for the remaining amount payable to the respondent number 2 viz. ICICI bank as the complainant is not liable to pay anything to the respondent number 2.”


Sunday, 18 April 2021

Doctrine of Lis Pendens: Nothing new should be introduced into a pending litigation.

Lis pendens means a suit under consideration of any court of law. It is an action which is pending in any court. The doctrine is enshrined under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. This section is based on the maxim ‘ut lite pendente nihil innovetur' which means that nothing new should be introduced into a pending litigation. Therefore, the property which is in dispute should not either be sold or otherwise dealt in by any party to the dispute during the pendency of the suit or proceeding. 

The doctrine of lis pendens incorporated under Section 52 of the 1929 Act, means to say that During the pendency of any suit or proceeding which is not collusive and in which any right to immoveable property is directly and specifically in question, the property cannot be transferred or otherwise dealt with by any party to the suit or proceeding so as to affect the rights of any other party thereto under any decree or order which may be made therein, except under the authority of the Court and on such terms as it may impose.

The Supreme Court in Jayaram Mudaliar v. Ayyaswami AIR 1973 SC 569, para. 47 founded the following definition:

lis pendens literally means a pending suit, and the doctrine of lis pendens has been defined as the jurisdiction, power, or control which a court acquires over property involved in a suit pending the continuance of the action, and until final judgment therein.

As was observed by the Supreme Court in Jayaram's case:

Expositions of the doctrine indicate that the need for it arises from the very nature of the jurisdiction of Courts and their control over the subject-matter of litigation so that parties litigating before it may not remove any part of the subject-matter outside the power of the Court to deal with it and thus make the proceedings infructuous.

Friday, 16 April 2021

RERA has superseding powers on Directorate of Enforcement as far as protection of homebuyer rights are concerned

 Before Ld. RERA Rajasthan:

Hydepark landowners association V. Adarsh Buldestate Ltd. (ABL)and others Complaint No. RAJ-RERA-C-201 9-31 69

The Authority has ruled that RERA has superseding powers on Directorate of Enforcement as far as protection of homebuyer rights are concerned;

it has Also ruled that valuation of “proceeds of crime” connected to a project cannot be more than actual amount invested towards the construction. Such a valuation can be arrived at through a government approved valuer by already legally settled principles of calculation methodology.

The Complete order can be seen at 

Maharashtra Real Estate Regulatory Authority (MahaRERA) has refused to differentiate between an investor in a housing project and a homebuyer

 The Maharashtra Real Estate Regulatory Authority (MahaRERA) in the matter of Kamal Aggarwal V/s Sakla Enterprises Complaint No. CC006000000171603 has refused to differentiate between an investor in a housing project and a homebuyer and has directed a developer to honour contractual obligations.


Complete order can be seen at 

https://media-exp1.licdn.com/dms/document/C561FAQHuOUtaDbRVDA/feedshare-document-pdf-analyzed/0/1610797082012?e=1618682400&v=beta&t=4MhyLgKZFWL_FzuePp0A6QXc8nKPXC50OMKONxECUKw

The Allahabad High Court - A single member of RERA can also adjudicate the complaints of home buyer.

 The Allahabad High Court  in the Matter of M/S K.D.P. Build Well Pvt Ltd vs State Of U.P. And 4 Others WRIT - C No. - 2248 of 2020 Decided on 4 February, 2020 has held that a single member of RERA can also adjudicate the complaints of home buyer.

It was pleaded that one member of RERA has passed the order in violation of the provisions of the Act of 2016. Section 21 provides for formation of Authority consist of Chairperson along with two whole time Members. The impugned order is by one Member alone going against the mandate of Section 21 of the Act of 2016.

The Court refused to accept the submission of Petitioner Counsel that the Punjab and Haryana High Court has taken a different view. Further the court observed that the Petitioner did not raised any objection before the single Member about his competence to adjudicate the complaint. In absence of objection, the Authority proceeded with the matter. If the objection would have been taken and was sustainable, the complaint could have been decided by the Authority consisting of three Members. The petitioner has challenged the order in reference to the composition only when he lost in the complaint

Referring to Section 21, 29 and 30 of the Act observed that it is not necessary that the adjudication of the complaint has to be made by the composition of Authority, as given under Section 21 of the Act of 2016 though as per Section 29 also, it should be by two Members in absence of the Chairperson. Further Section 30 protects proceedings from invalidation due to any vacancy. 

it was held that 

"We are further not inclined to interfere in the impugned orders on the ground taken by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the order passed by a single member is without jurisdiction as contemplated under Section 21 of the Act and has not been passed in accordance with the provisions of Section 21 of the Act. The arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner appears us to be misconceived. The proposition of Section 21 is not that the complaint could not be decided by a single member of the Authority, whereas it could be decided by a single member or by two members, whichever is better in the interest of justice as per availability of the members and we further observed that Section 81 of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 provides "delegation", which says that "The Authority may, by general or special order in writing, delegate to any member, officer of the Authority or any other person subject to such conditions, if any, as may be specified in the order, such of its powers and functions under this Act ( except the power to make regulations under section 85), as it may deem necessary" and having regard to the provision of Section 81 of the Real Estate ( Regulation and Development) Act, 2016, the authority vide their 5th meeting dated 5.12.2018 as per Agenda 1 delegated the power to a single member to decide the cases in both the Benches sitting at Lucknow and Gautam Budh Nagar, the delegation of power of the 5th meeting dated 5.12.2018 of U.P. Real Estate Regulatory Authority is quoted as under:"


MINIMUM 100 HOMEBUYERS or 10% of the total allottees are REQUIRED TO INITIATE IBC CASE:SUPREME COURT AFFIRMS THE AMENDMENT

 In Manish Kumar v. Union of India & Ors., the Supreme Court of India rejected a writ petition challenging the constitutional validity of Section 3, 4 and 10 of Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2020 (“IBC Amendment”), which prescribes the requirement of a minimum of 100 or not less than ten per cent of allottees of a real estate project acting as creditors in the same class, whichever is less, for initiating corporate insolvency resolution process against the developer company.

 The Court held that the IBC Amendment protects the interest of the allotees across the board and allowing a single allottee to move an application under IBC may put the interest of all other allottees in peril. 

This can also result in some allottees approaching the real estate regulating authority (RERA) while other may resort to the consumer forum. The Court said that the group of allottees in a real estate project are a heterogenous group and a vast majority of allottees may see reason in giving time and reposing faith in the existing management of real estate project, rather than bringing a complete overhaul or replacement of the developer’s company management. 

Therefore, the amendments provided under the IBC Amendment are not arbitrary in nature and are constitutionally valid

Tuesday, 13 April 2021

Land Owners can’t be Punished in Joint Ventures – Tamil Nadu RERA

 In a complaint filed by Shankari Sundararaman (“Complainant”) against Sree Vardhana Builders Private Limited (“Company”), 265 of 2020 its directors and landowners of the Project named ‘Vardhana Constellation’ in Coimbatore, for claiming refund of amounts paid towards the purchase of the flat under Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (“Act”), the Tamil Nadu Real Estate Regulatory Authority, Chennai (“TNRERA”) stated that since directors are actively involved in the affairs of the Company and have received money and corresponded with the Complainant, they would be liable for violations under Section 69 the Act which deals with offences by companies and people responsible for the conduct/business of the company. 

However, with respect to landowners of the project site (being the other respondents), TNRERA stated that the landowners had just entered into joint venture agreements and had executed general power of attorney with the Company. The sale deeds for the undivided share of land was only executed by the Company and not the landowners. 

Further, it was stated that it was the Company that had launched the project and had entered into various agreements with the Complainant for construction and delivery of the constructed apartment on receiving consideration. 

Henceforth, the landowners would not come under the definition of “promoter” and only the Company would fall under the definition of “promoter” to be made liable for contravention under Section 31 read with Section 71 of the Act

Adjudicating Officer Under RERA is only Empowered to Adjudge Compensation Under Section 71 and Section 72 of the RERA and does not have Jurisdiction to decide Matters for Allowing Refund Under Section 18 of the RERA

The Maharashtra Real Estate Appellate Tribunal, Mumbai (“Appellate Tribunal”), in the matter of Xrbia Developers Ltd. v. Firoz Aziz Shaikh (“Appeal”), has, inter alia, held that the Adjudicating Officer (“AO”) under RERA is only empowered to adjudicate on the compensation to be granted under Section 71 and Section 72 of the RERA. 

The Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal has further held that the jurisdiction to adjudicate on the matters relating to refund with interest under Section 18 of RERA vests with Adjudicating Authority. 

The Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal, whilst deciding the issue of sustainability of the order passed by AO in the complaint preferred by the allottee seeking refund with interest along with other reliefs had held that, 

“11. Considering the legal position discussed and held as above, it is crystal clear that AO has powers only to adjudge compensation under Sections 71 read with 72 of RERA and has no jurisdiction to decide matters for allowing refund with interest under Section 18 which is vested with the Authority only. Consequently, the order passed by AO with regard to subject matter involved in the above complaint is obviously without jurisdiction as per provisions of RERA. It is a fundamental principle well established that an order passed by a forum having no jurisdiction over subject matter is a nullity. An objection to lts valldity can be raised at any time including the appeal proceedings. For the said reasons, the impugned order passed by AO cannot be sustained and therefore is liable to be quashed and set aside being a nulllty for lack of jurisdiction of subject matter as contended by Promoter, We answer the point accordingly.”

Decree holder cannot be classified as a financial creditor for the purpose of initiating Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (“CIRP”) under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“IBC”)

 The National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi (“NCLAT”) has in its judgment dated August 14, 2020 (“Judgment”) in the matter of Sushil Ansal v. Ashok Tripathi and Others [Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 452 of 2020], held that a decree holder cannot be classified as a financial creditor for the purpose of initiating Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (“CIRP”) under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“IBC”).

Facts

Brief facts of the case are that 

  • on August 5, 2014, one Mr. Ashok Tripathi (“Respondent No. 1”) and Mr. Saurabh Tripathi (“Respondent No. 2”) (collectively, “Respondents”) had jointly booked a unit bearing No. 0073, admeasuring 3746 sq. ft., with M/s. Ansal Properties and Infrastructure Limited (“Corporate Debtor”) in one of their real estate projects namely, Sushant Golf City, in Lucknow, for a total consideration of INR 1,62,43,133/- by paying an amount of INR 8,37,300/- towards booking advance. 
  • In a separate transaction, Respondent No. 2 had on July 16, 2014, booked another unit bearing No. B7/GF/01, admeasuring 1229 sq. ft. in the same project, by paying an amount of INR 1,63,994/- as booking advance. A joint “built up agreement/builder buyer agreement” dated September 12, 2014, in respect of the unit bearing No. 0073 and a “Flat Buyer Agreement” dated September 28, 2014 in respect of the unit bearing No. B7/GF/01 was executed between the respective Respondents with the Corporate Debtor. Pursuant to execution of the aforementioned agreements, allotment letters pertaining to the said units were issued by the Corporate Debtor to each of the Respondents.
  • The Corporate Debtor undertook to complete the construction of the said units and to deliver possession thereof to the said Respondents within 2 years from the date of commencement of construction. Since the project commencement date notified on the website of RERA was September 22, 2015, the Corporate Debtor was required to deliver possession of the unit bearing No. 0073 to both the Respondents by September 22, 2017 and deliver possession of the unit bearing No. B7/GF/01 to the Respondent No. 2 within 36 months from the date of the building plan being sanctioned. 
  • However, even after the passing of 5 years of the aforementioned time frame, the Corporate Debtor failed to complete the construction of the said units or refund the amounts paid as booking advance, to the Respondents.
  • Whether this is a fit case for invoking Rule 11 of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal Rules, 2016 (“NCLAT Rules”) to allow the parties to settle the dispute?
  • Whether the application filed by the Respondents under Section 7 of the IBC was not maintainable?
  • The NCLAT observed that a Corporate Debtor was permitted to seek exit from CIRP at the pre-admission stage. It could also seek exit at the post admission stage, but before constitution of the Committee of Creditors. It was manifest that a party to CIRP could approach the adjudicating authority directly for exercise of its inherent powers under Rule 11 of the NCLT Rules, 2016 for withdrawal of the application under Section 7 of the IBC or disposal of such application on the basis of a settlement worked out by the parties. 
  • However, exercise of inherent power on the part of adjudicating authority or even by the NCLAT in appeal would depend on consideration of all relevant facts of the case. The adjudicating authority or the appellate tribunal would have to keep in view the interest of various stakeholders and claimants before allowing such withdrawal or settlement. 
  • Admittedly, the interim resolution professional had received 283 claims against the Corporate Debtor from allottees of different projects, financial creditors, operational creditors, other creditors and employees. The Settlement Deed executed between the Respondents and the Corporate Debtor did not take into consideration the interest of such other claimants. Therefore, allowing the withdrawal of application under Section 7 of the IBC on the basis of such settlement between the Respondents and the Corporate Debtor was not all-encompassing and detrimental to the interests of the other claimants, including the other allottees, and accordingly would not be in consonance with the object of the IBC and the purpose of invoking of Rule 11 of the NCLAT Rules.
  • With respect to maintainability of the application under Section 7 of the IBC, the NCLAT observed that the dictum of law was loud and clear. An application for initiating CIRP against the Corporate Debtor by allottees under a real estate project was required to be filed jointly by not less than one hundred of such allottees or not less than 10% of the total number of such allottees under the same real estate project. It is therefore clear that an application at the instance of a single allottee or by a group of allottees falling short of the prescribed threshold limit would not be maintainable.

Aggrieved by the above, the Respondents lodged a complaint before the Uttar Pradesh Real Estate Regulatory Authority (“UP RERA”) to establish the existence of a financial debt and liability of the Corporate Debtor to the tune of INR 73,35,686.43. Pursuant to this, on November 16, 2017, the UP RERA directed the Corporate Debtor to refund the amount repayable to the Respondents with respect to the unit bearing No. 0073 in 6 instalments within a period of 9 months. Subsequently, on December 13, 2018, the UP RERA further directed the Corporate Debtor to refund the amount paid with respect to the unit bearing No. B7/GF/01 to Respondent No.2 in 10 monthly instalments along with interest. 

Consequently, a Recovery Certificate dated August 10, 2019 (“Recovery Certificate”) was issued by the UP RERA in this regard and forwarded to the concerned authority for effecting the recovery of INR 73,35,686.43 from the Corporate Debtor. However, the Respondents chose to file an application under Section 7 of the IBC for initiation of CIRP before the National Company Law Tribunal, New Delhi (“NCLT”) even though they were entitled to seek disbursement of the above mentioned amount of INR 73,35,686.43 from UP RERA upon its recovery.

The NCLT observed that the claim of the allottees had arisen out of the aforementioned orders and Recovery Certificate issued by the UP RERA and termed such claim as an ‘adjudicated debt’. It therefore held that the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Ordinance, 2019 (“Ordinance”) promulgated on December 28, 2019, which prescribes a minimum threshold limit of not less than 100 allottees or not less than 10% of the total number of allottees under the same real estate project, whichever is less, for initiation of CIRP at the instance of allottees of a real estate project, was not attracted in the present case, as the Respondents went before the NCLT as decree-holders and not as allottees. Thus, the NCLT, vide its impugned order dated March 17, 2020 (“NCLT Order”), admitted the application of the Respondents for initiating CIRP. Aggrieved by the said NCLT Order, Mr. Sushil Ansal, a former director and shareholder of the Corporate Debtor (“Appellant”), filed the present appeal before the NCLAT.

Issues


Arguments

Contentions raised by the Appellant:

The Appellant inter alia contended that the application filed by the Respondents under Section 7 of the IBC was not maintainable as the Respondents did not meet the required criteria of either constituting 100 allottees or 10% of the total allottees as mandated under the Ordinance, and therefore were ineligible to by themselves file an application under Section 7 of the IBC for initiation of CIRP against the Corporate Debtor. The Appellant argued that the Ordinance was promulgated and came into force during the pendency of the applications filed by the Respondents before the NCLT and therefore the NCLT should have insisted upon compliance with the mandate under the Ordinance regarding the threshold limit before proceeding to pass the impugned order. It was further argued that the Ordinance was followed by the passing of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2020 (“Amendment Act”) which incorporated the provisions of the Ordinance, and in effect crystallised the legal position pertaining to eligibility for initiating of CIRP, and therefore the application filed by the Respondents under Section 7 was not maintainable. It was also urged that classification of allottees as Financial Creditors was not permissible and merely because the Respondents had obtained a RERA decree in their favour, it did not alter their status. Therefore, the finding recorded by the NCLT that the allottees who have obtained a decree in their favour would not be hit by the requirement of threshold limit under the Ordinance followed by the Amendment Act was flawed. It was further submitted that the dispute stood settled between the Corporate Debtor and the Respondents in terms of an amicable settlement between the parties pursuant to which they had filed a joint application for withdrawal and termination of CIRP of the Corporate Debtor.

Contentions raised by the Respondents:

The Respondents on the other hand contended that they had settled all their disputes with the Appellant in relation to the unit bearing no. 0073 and they do not have any pending claims against the Corporate Debtor. The Respondents accordingly prayed for invoking Rule 11 of the NCLAT Rules to set aside the order of admission and terminate the CIRP against the Corporate Debtor. It was further submitted that the dispute was settled prior to constitution of a committee of creditors and therefore there was no legal impediment in allowing such settlement and permit withdrawal and termination of CIRP. In so far as the claims of other home buyers/ creditors was concerned, it was submitted that they could pursue their claims independently on their own merits through any remedy as may be available under law. As regards the instant appeal, it was submitted that the Respondents did not wish to contest the issue raised by the Appellant regarding maintainability of the application under Section 7 filed by them and, therefore, agreed and subscribed to the arguments advanced by the Appellant.

Observations of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi:

It was further observed by the NCLAT that, the Respondents’ contention of coming within the purview of ‘financial creditors’ rested on strength of the definition of ‘creditor’ in terms of the provision under Section 3(10) of the IBC which includes a decree-holder within its fold. The question that arose for consideration was whether a decree-holder, though covered under the definition of ‘creditor’, fell within the definition of a ‘financial creditor’ as per of Section 5(7) of the IBC. On a plain reading of the provision, it is clear that ‘Financial Creditor’ encompasses any person to whom a financial debt is due. It would, therefore, be relevant to ascertain the nature of debt styled as ‘financial debt’ within the ambit of Section 5(8) of the IBC. Since the initial transaction was an allotment under a real estate project, there could be no doubt that such transaction had the contours of a borrowing as contemplated under Section 5(8)(f) of the IBC. However, the case set up by the Respondents before the NCLT was not on the strength of a transaction having the commercial effect of a borrowing thereby giving them the status of ‘financial creditors’ but on the strength of being ‘decree-holders’. It was noted that, the Respondents had staked claim as ‘decree-holders’ before the NCLT and therefore they could not later claim to be allottees, classifying the amounts raised from them to have the commercial effect of a borrowing, and hence, cloaking them with the capacity of being ‘financial creditors’. Hence, it was required to be determined whether a ‘decree-holder’ could maintain an application under Section 7 as a ‘financial creditor’.

The NCLAT further noted that a ‘decree-holder’ would undoubtedly be covered by the definition of ‘creditor’ under Section 3(10) of the IBC, but cannot be classified as a ‘Financial Creditor’, unless the debt was disbursed against the consideration for time value of money or falls within any of the provisions thereof, as the definition of ‘financial debt’ is inclusive in character. In the instant case, RERA had conducted the recovery proceedings at the instance of the Respondents against the Corporate Debtor which culminated in the issuance of the Recovery Certificate and passing of an order directing the concerned authority to recover an amount of INR 73,35,686.43 from the Corporate Debtor as arrears towards land revenue. However, instead of pursuing the matter before the competent authority, the Respondents sought to trigger CIRP against the Corporate Debtor. Therefore, the answer to the question on whether a decree-holder would fall within the definition of ‘Financial Creditor’ in such a scenario had to be an emphatic ‘No’ as the amount claimed under the decree was an adjudicated amount and not a debt disbursed against the consideration for the time value of money and therefore did not fall within the ambit of any of the provisions under Section 5(8) of the IBC. It was indisputable that the Recovery Certificate sought to be executed was the end product of an adjudicatory mechanism under the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016, and realisation of the amount due under the Recovery Certificate tantamount to recovery effected under a money decree, though the mode of execution was slightly different. In view of the aforesaid observations, the NCLAT was of the view that the application of the Respondents under Section 7 of the IBC was not maintainable.

Decision of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi

In allowing the appeal, the NCLAT noted that the Respondents could not claim to be allottees of a real estate project after issuance of the Recovery Certificate by UP RERA directing recovery of INR 73,35,686.43 as arrears towards land revenue. The NCLAT stated that the Respondents were decree-holders seeking execution of money due under the Recovery Certificate, which is impermissible within the ambit of Section 7 of the IBC. Therefore, their application for triggering of CIRP was not maintainable as allottees. Decree-holders, though included in the definition of ‘creditor’, did not fall within the definition of ‘financial creditor’ and hence a ‘decree-holder’ could not seek initiation of CIRP as a ‘financial creditor’.

In view of the conclusion reached and findings on the issues recorded, the NCLAT was of the opinion that the impugned NCLT Order initiating CIRP against the Corporate Debtor was not sustainable. The NCLAT was also of the firm view that the application of Respondents was moved for execution/recovery of the amount due under the Recovery Certificate and not for insolvency resolution of the Corporate Debtor. The NCLAT was of the view that the said NCLT Order suffered from grave legal infirmity and could not be supported and accordingly set it aside.